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NOTE 
Federal Common Law and Gaps in Federal Statutes: The 
Case of ERISA Plan Limitation Periods for Section 
S02(a)(l)(B) Actions 
Jim Greiner 
[W]here power of choice [between state and federal law] exists, 
what are the criteria for its exercise; under what circumstances should 
a federal substantive rule be prescribed, and when should state law be 
incorporated?1 
Over thirty-five years ago Professor Paul Mishkin posed his 
question in what has become a canonical work2 in the area of fed-
eral common law; the answer to Mishkin's question is not clear to-
day. The lack of set criteria in this area is no doubt due in part to 
the stunning variety of factual and legal situations in which 
Mishkin's question can arise. This Note seeks to contribute to the 
understanding in this field by examining a particular federal com-
mon law issue: the validity of clauses within employee benefits 
plans purporting to set an enforceable limitation period for a cause 
of action filed under section 502(a)(l)(B) of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).3 The aim of this Note 
is thus twofold. Its narrow purpose is to argue that federal courts 
should enforce BRISA plan limitation periods providing a reason-
able length of time for a lawsuit,4 and that they should do so regard-
less of the law of any particular state. The more general project is 
to develop a framework for deciding when federal courts exercising 
their federal common lawmaking powers to provide a rule of deci-
sion for a particular case should borrow state law or construct a 
uniform national rule. The framework developed in this Note con-
sists of a series of factors that the Supreme Court has looked to in 
1. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the 
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 810 (1957). 
2. Supreme Court opinions have cited Mishkin's article numerous times. See, e.g., Wilson 
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 287 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); De!Costello v. International 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 160 n.13 (1983); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 70 n.9 
(1981); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 (1979); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 
U.S. 715, 727 n.19 (1979); Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 35 (1977) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973); UAW v. 
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 n.9 (1966); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 666 
(1963). 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988). 
4. The caveat requiring a plan limitation period to provide a reasonable time for a lawsuit 
comes from both the common law and the purposes of ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B). See infra 
notes 202-07, 215-20 and accompanying text. 
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past cases when answering the question Mishkin posed. These fac-
tors should provide partial guidance to federal courts confronting 
federal common law questions in statutory contexts other than 
ERISA section S02(a)(l)(B) lawsuits. 
INTRODUCTION 
ERISA regulates pension and welfare plans adopted for the 
benefit of employees and their dependents.5 Congress sought to 
protect the interests of participants in employee benefits plans6 by 
regulating the administration of such plans and by providing 
employee-beneficiaries a variety of remedies to assure compliance 
with the statutory framework.7 As part of this system of remedies, 
ERISA section 502(a)(l)(B) grants plan participants a federal 
cause of action against the plan to recover wrongfully denied bene-
fits. 8 Because benefits plans often provide a wide variety of serv-
ices such as medical insurance, vacation pay, and retirement 
payments,9 the scope of section 502(a)(l)(B) extends to wrongful 
denial of a large array of benefits. 
ERISA provides no statute of limitations applicable to a section 
502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit.10 The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen 
Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of 
action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation 
as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do 
so."11 That is, federal courts confronting a federal statutory cause 
of action without a limitation period "close [the] interstices in fed-
eral law"12 or "fill the gap left by Congress,"13 and they do so typi-
5. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CoMM., ABA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 19 (1991). 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(3) (1988). 
7. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CoMM., ABA, supra note 5, at 17 (citing 29 U.S.C. § lOOlb 
(1988)). 
8. Section 502{a)(l)(B) provides, "A civil action may be brought by a participant or ben-
eficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan .... " 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a){l)(B) (1988). 
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) {1988) {defining BRISA-covered welfare plans as plans 
that provide health and vacation benefits); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988) (defining ERISA-
covered pension plans as plans that provide retirement benefits). 
10. Congress closed similar gaps in federal statutes passed after 1990 with the Judiciary 
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (codified as amended at 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1991)). The limitation provision of the Judiciary 
Improvements Act provides, "Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising 
under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be 
commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. III 
1991). This statute does not apply to ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B), which was passed in 1974. 
11. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1985); see also Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 {1974) (citing cases in which the Supreme Court borrowed 
state limitation periods to apply to federal statutory causes of action). "Local time limita-
tion" in this context means a state statute of limitations. 
12. West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987). 
13. 481 U.S. at 40 n.6. 
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cally by borrowing a state statute of limitations. In so doing, federal 
courts construct federal common law14 by adopting state statutes of 
limitations as the rule of decision for federal causes of action.15 Al-
most all federal circuit courts of appeals have followed this practice 
for BRISA section 502(a) actions, including lawsuits under section 
502(a)(1)(B).16 The majority of courts considering this limitation 
issue in the context of a section 502(a)(l)(B) suit have applied the 
state statute of limitations for actions on a written contract.17 
Almost all federal courts have also borrowed state law18 to de-
cide the related issue that is the subject of this Note: whether to 
enforce plan provisions that modify the applicable limitation period 
for a section 502(a)(1)(B) lawsuit.19 These courts have enforced 
14. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (characterizing the borrowing 
process as an exercise of federal common law construction). 
15. 327 U.S. at 395. When a federal court chooses to borrow a state statute of limitations, 
it first characterizes the essence of the federal cause of action involved; it then decides which 
state limitation period governs the state cause of action most analogous or similar to the 
federal action at issue. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268. In performing this analysis, federal courts 
incorporate the relevant state legislature's judgment as to the proper balance among the 
competing social interests of repose, increased accuracy in a truth-finding process based on 
fresh evidence, and preservation of a plaintiff's right to recover for wrongful acts. 471 U.S. at 
271. 
16. See, e.g., Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 942 F.2d 1260, 1261-62 (8th Cir. 
1991); see also James S. Ray, Overview of ERISA Title I Enforcement: Procedural Aspects, in 
1994 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LmoATION: ALI-ABA CouRSE OF Sroov MATERIALS No. 
C887, at 385, 424-25 (collecting cases). But see Meagher v. IAM Pension Plan, 856 F.2d 1418, 
1422-23 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying a limitation period contained within ERISA § 413(a)(2), 29 
U.S.C. § 1113(a)(2) (1988), without considering the state statute of limitations alternative), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1039 (1989); Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co. Pension 'Ihlst, 757 F.2d 
52, 54-55 (3d Cir.) (borrowing the limitation period found in ERISA § 413(a)(2)), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985). The latter two cases, however, appear to represent aberrations 
from the law of their circuits. For the more common approach in the Ninth Circuit, see 
Trustees for Alaska Laborers v. Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512, 516-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (borrowing a 
state statute of limitations in a suit for unpaid contributions); Mann v. New England Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., No. C-89-0814 MHP, 1991 WL 631954, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1991) (explic-
itly recognizing the aberrational nature of Meagher). For the more common approach in the 
Third Circuit, see Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1179-82 (3d Cir. 1992) (borrowing 
the most analogous state period for a§ 502(a)(l)(B) action in a case decided after Edwards). 
17. See, e.g., Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1992); Meade v. Pension 
Appeals & Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1992); Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1261-
63; Dameron v. Sinai Hosp., 815 F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1987); Jenkins v. Local 705 Intl. Bhd. 
of Teamsters Pension Fund, 713 F.2d 247, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1983). 
18. All references to state law in this Introduction are to the law of the state in which the 
district court sits. Interstate choice of law problems lurk in the background in this area. See 
infra text accompanying notes 157-58. 
19. See, e.g., Payne v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 91-2583, 1992 WL 235537 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 24, 1992); Koonan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 802 F. Supp. 1424 (E.D. Va. 1992); 
Davis v. National Maritime Union Pension & Welfare Plan, 810 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992); Bologna v. National Maritime Union Pension 'Ihlst Fund of the Natl. Maritime Union 
Pension & Welfare Plan, 654 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Moro v. Welfare Plan of the Natl. 
Maritime Union Pension & Welfare Plan, No. 84 Civ. 9275, 1985 WL 1896 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 
1985); Scheirer v. National Maritime Union Pension & Welfare Plan, 585 F. Supp. 76 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Chilcote v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 841 F. Supp. 877 
(E.D. Wis. 1993) (upholding a plan limitation period without clearly specifying whether the 
rule of decision came from state or federal law). 
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shorter limitation periods contained within plans if state law al-
lowed contractual modification of limitation periods. Those courts 
looking to state contract law have followed the general sense 
among federal courts that an BRISA plan is in some ways analo-
gous to a contract,2° and that section 502(a)(l)(B) actions are 
analogous to actions for breach of contract.21 Only one federal dis-
trict court has disagreed, stating that "[t]hose state courts which 
have addressed the issue of whether parties may modify a state stat-
ute of limitations by a mutually agreed upon contract provision did 
not reach their conclusions with national interests in mind."22 · 
The validity of plan provisions modifying the relevant state limi-
tation period is a matter of great importance to parties litigating a 
section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit. If courts invalidate such provisions, 
the state statute of limitations for suits on a written contract proba-
bly will govem.23 Such limitation periods typically are long, some 
Plan limitation periods typically appear in regulations promulgated by a trustee pursuant 
to an ERISA trust document. At least one court has held that a trustee to an ERISA bene-
fits plan who inserts a provision in the plan shortening the time limit for a§ 502(a)(l)(B) suit 
exceeds the authority delegated to her by the trust agreement, unless the agreement specifi-
cally grants her the power to promulgate rules concerning the time or procedures governing 
the filing of suits in court. Bologna, 654 F. Supp. at 640-41. Another court has held plan 
limitation periods invalid because plan beneficiaries do not actually "agree" to such regula-
tions when they are issued subsequent to a trust agreement or a collective bargaining agree-
ment that does not explicitly authorize their promulgation. Davis, 810 F. Supp. at 534. This 
Note does not address the delegation or agreement issues. 
The following is an example of a typical plan provision providing a shortened limitation 
period: 
"LIMITATION OF ACTION: No action at law or suit in equity may be brought against 
the plan more than twelve (12) months after the date on which the cause of action ac-
crued with respect to any matter relating to: this Contract; the Plan's performance 
under this Contract; or any statement made by employees, officers or directors of the 
Plan concerning the contract or the benefits available to a Member." 
Payne, 1992 WL 235537, at *l (quoting the plan at issue in the case). 
20. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (refer-
ring to ERISA plan benefits as "contractually authorized benefits"); Trustees of the Wyo. 
Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 620 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (analogizing§ 502(a)(l)(B) actions to breach of contract actions). 
21. See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 19 (borrowing state statutes of limitations for suits 
on a written contract for§ 502(a)(l)(B) actions because such actions are most analogous to 
suits for breach of a written contract). 
22. Plazzo v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (N.D. Ohio 1988), revd. 
on other grounds, No. 88-4016, 1989 WL 154816 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 1989) (describing grounds 
for reversal of the case reported without opinion at 892 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1989)), cerL denied, 
498 U.S. 950 (1990). Portions of the Plazza opinion are curious. The language quoted in the 
text notwithstanding, the Plazza court hinted that it would have enforced the plan provision 
if a state statute had expressly permitted the parties to a contract to shorten the otherwise 
applicable limitation period. 697 F. Supp. at 1441. The difficulty with this reasoning is that 
state legislatures have no greater duty to consider federal interests in making state limitation 
law than do state courts. Nevertheless, the holding of the case is clear: the court refused to 
borrow state law that would have upheld the plan limitation period because state decision-
making bodies did not decide limitation issues with federal interests in mind. 
23. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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of them ten years or more,24 and exposure to potential lawsuits for 
such lengthy time periods could adversely affect plan management. 
If courts enforce plan modifications, however, employees will have 
a shortened opportunity to recover benefits otherwise due under 
ERISA.25 
The question of whether to borrow state law to determine the 
validity of plan limitation periods is similar to questions facing 
courts that confront other contractual modifications in suits arising 
under the Commodity Exchange Act,26 the Federal Emergency Pe-
troleum Allocation Act of 1973,27 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.28 All of 
these courts, like most courts considering the question in the con-
text of BRISA section 502(a)(1)(B), have borrowed state law to 
decide the validity of the contractual limitation periods. 
Judges determining the validity of BRISA plan limitation peri-
ods must first address the preliminary question of whether to bor-
row state law or to construct a uniform national rule to decide the 
issue. If federal courts borrow state law, then the enforceability of 
plan modifications will vary from state to state, depending on state 
common and statutory law.29 If courts refuse to borrow state law, 
they must construct a uniform national rule to decide the validity of 
plan limitation periods, raising the question of whether this national 
rule should uphold or invalidate such plan provisions. At least 
since 1868, federal courts have applied a common law rule that the 
parties to a contract may shorten the applicable limitation period so 
24. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-206 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (providing a statute 
of limitations of 10 years); IND. CoDE ANN. § 34-1-2-2(6) (West 1983) (allowing 10 years for 
suits on written contracts other than those to pay money); lowA CODE § 614.1(5) (West 
Supp. 1994) (providing a statute of limitations of 10 years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 413.090(2) {Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (providing a statute of limitations of 15 years). 
25. See cases cited in supra note 19 (illustrating that employees have already lost 
§ 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits because of their failure to file within the time specified by plan limita-
tion periods). 
26. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988); see Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1987). 
27. Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (expired Sept. 30, 1981); see Reynolds Indus. v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 618 F. Supp. 419 (D. Mass. 1985). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988); see Taylor v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
29. Some states have statutes explicitly allowing the parties to a contract to modify the 
limitation period for a lawsuit. See, e.g., N.Y. C1v. PRAc. L. & R. 201 (McKinney 1990). In 
other states, state common law provides that courts should enforce a modification provision 
so long as no statute says otherwise and so long as the contract's limitation period provides a 
reasonable length of time for suit. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Order of United Commercial 'Ii'avel-
ers of Am., 821 S.W.2d 30 (Ark. 1991) (holding that Arkansas state common law allows the 
parties to shorten the limitation period by contract). A third group of states have statutes 
prohibiting courts from enforcing any contractual provision shortening a limitation period. 
See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 6-2-15 (1975); FLA. STAT. ch. 95.03 (1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-5 
(1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 216 (West 1993); 
S.D. ComFIED LAws ANN. § 53-9-6 (1990); see also U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1989) {prohibiting 
the parties, in a contract for the sale of goods, from providing for a contractual limitation 
period shorter than a year). 
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long as no statute provides otherwise and so long as the contract's 
modified period provides a reasonable length of time for suit.3o If 
federal courts apply this common law rule to BRISA actions, then 
courts must enforce reasonable plan limitation periods; if the rule 
does not apply, such modifications may be held invalid. 
This Note argues that federal courts should adopt a uniform na-
tional rule that upholds plan provisions modifying the limitation pe-
riod for a section 502(a)(l)(B) action. Part I examines the 
reasoning of those courts that have borrowed state law to deter-
mine the validity of modifications of the limitation period applica-
ble to actions arising under BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B) and under 
other federal statutes. Part I argues that those courts may have in-
correctly characterized the validity of plan limitation periods as an 
issue of limitation law. As a consequence of this characterization, 
those courts have followed the Supreme Court's rule that, when 
borrowing a state's statute of limitations, federal courts should also 
borrow the state's law regarding the "overtones and details" of the 
limitation period.31 Part I argues, however, that the validity of con-
tractual limitation periods is not an overtone or detail of a statute of 
limitations, and thus that federal courts have erroneously applied 
the overtones or details principle as a justification for borrowing 
state law on the modification issue. 
The next two Parts then examine other sources to determine 
whether - and how - courts should enforce plan modifications of 
applicable state limitation periods. Part II argues that the purpose 
behind the preemption of state law effectuated by ERISA section 
514(a)32 suggests that federal courts should formulate a uniform na-
tional rule without reference to the law of any particular state. Be-
cause - as Part II also shows - there is reason to think that 
section 514(a) does not fully dispose of the issue, Part III looks to 
principles of federal common law for further support. Specifically, 
Part III identifies a list of factors that courts should consider when 
deciding whether to borrow state law in a suit arising under a fed-
eral statute, then applies these factors to the question of the validity 
of plan limitation periods. These principles lead to the simultane-
ous conclusions that (i) federal courts should adopt a uniform na-
tional rule governing the validity of plan limitation periods, and (ii) 
that this rule should declare reasonable plan limitation periods 
valid and enforceable. 
30. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947); 
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1868); cf. Thompson v. Phenix Ins. 
Co., 136 U.S. '2137, 297-98 (1890) (stating that clauses limiting the time to bring an action are 
valid contractual stipulations). 
31. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975); see infra notes 48-
50 and accompanying text. 
32. 29U.S.C.§1144(a) (1988). 
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Finally, Part IV rejects concerns that the rule recommended in 
Part III conflicts with the purposes or policies of BRISA. In partic-
ular, Part IV argues that the federal court habit of relying on pre-
existing common law to fill in gaps in federal statutes suggests that a 
similar practice in this instance is unlikely to conflict with Con-
gress's intent. Furthermore, Part IV concludes that upholding plan 
limitation periods is consistent with congressional intent even if en-
forcing such periods causes some meritorious section 502(a)(1)(B) 
claims to fail. 
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MODIFICATION ISSUE 
This Part argues that those federal courts borrowing state law to 
decide the validity of plan limitation periods have erroneously char-
acterized the issue as one of limitation law. The argument proceeds 
in three steps. Section I.A outlines the basic history and modem 
structure of the borrowing doctrine as articulated by the Supreme 
Court. This doctrine dictates that courts should borrow state law 
regarding the "overtones and details" of a limitation period. Sec-
tion I.B concludes that federal courts borrowing state law to decide 
the validity of contractual limitation periods in the context of fed-
eral statutory causes of action may have followed the borrowing 
practice because they consider modification to be an overtone or 
detail of a state statute of limitations. Section I.C, however, relies 
on analogous Supreme Court precedent to argue that the validity of 
contractual limitation periods is not an overtone or detail of a state 
statute of limitations. 
A. The History and Basic Structure of the Borrowing Doctrine 
This section briefly reviews the history and structure of the fed-
eral court practice of borrowing state limitation law. It demon-
strates that federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations 
because of their desire to incorporate some legislative judgment on 
the proper balance of the values of repose, accuracy in the fact-
finding process, and the plaintiff's right to recover. Federal courts 
also borrow related state principles of tolling, application, and revi-
val because state doctrines in these areas are inseparably related to 
the state statute of limitations itself. The impetus to borrow state 
law on these related principles stems from the same source as the 
desire to borrow state statutes of limitations, namely, a desire to 
incorporate a legislative judgment balancing certain values in a con-
text closely analogous to the case before the federal court. 
1. The Borrowing Doctrine: State Statutes of Limitations 
Federal courts in the 1800s and early 1900s applied state limita-
tion periods to federal lawsuits not because they followed a federal 
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common law doctrine of borrowing, but rather because they felt 
bound to do so. The reason courts felt so bound is a matter of dis-
pute. Some courts explicitly relied on the Rules of Decision Act, 
which requires federal courts to enforce state laws "in cases where 
they apply."33 Statutes of limitations were one type of a large vari-
ety of state rules that federal courts believed the Rules of Decision 
Act required them to follow.34 
The Supreme Court's holding in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 35 effec-
tively ended the force of this rationale. In Erie, the Court held that 
the Rules of Decision Act was merely declaratory on the issue of 
whether federal courts should apply federal common law or state 
law in diversity cases; the Constitution, and not the Act, makes 
state laws binding in the federal courts.36 
In Holmberg v. Armbrecht,37 the Supreme Court announced the 
Court's modem borrowing principle: "[T]he silence of Congress 
has been interpreted to mean that it is federal policy to adopt the 
local law of limitation."38 Holmberg marks a fundamental shift in 
thinking about when and why federal courts should borrow state 
limitation law to apply to federal causes of action. If the force of 
state limitation periods depends only on a federal policy of applying 
such periods as part of the federal courts' prudential duty to "fash-
ion[] remedial details where Congress has not spoken,"39 then 
other federal policies might preclude federal courts from applying 
state limitation law. After Holmberg, federal court decisions spoke 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988); see, e.g., Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-17 (1895); 
M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830). 
34. See 155 U.S. at 617-19 (listing state rules considered binding on federal courts). 
35. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
36. 304 U.S. at 71-80. Responding to Erie's construction of the Rules of Decision Act, 
Justice Scalia has interpreted the early cases stating that federal courts were bound to apply 
state limitation periods as holding that state law applied of its own force: "[S)tate statutes of 
limitations whose terms appear to cover federal statutory causes of action appl[ied] as a mat-
ter of state law to such claims .... " Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 
483 U.S. 143, 161 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Thus before Erie, either 
because of the Rules of Decision Act or because of an inherent power of state legislatures to 
bind federal courts, state limitation periods applied directly to federal statutory causes of 
action. 
Justice Scalia's view that state statutes of limitations apply with binding force upon fed-
eral courts is curious, given the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and traditional 
attitudes about the ability of state law to affect the federal courts in suits arising under fed-
eral statutes. Interestingly, while Scalia's concurrence in Agency Holding contains a great 
deal of historical analysis, a theoretical justification for the principle that state legislatures 
can bind federal courts in this manner is conspicuously absent. Justice Scalia has, however, 
provided two additional justifications for continuing the borrowing practice. See infra note 
47. 
37. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). 
38. 327 U.S. at 395. The Holmberg Court did not examine the Rules of Decision Act. 
Rather, the Court stated simply that congressional silence signifies that federal courts should 
borrow state limitation law. 
39. 327 U.S. at 395. 
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of "borrowing"40 - as opposed to "applying" - state limitation 
periods, signifying the shift in thinking stimulated by the case. 
In spite of this shift, courts continued to look almost exclusively 
to state law to provide limitation periods for congressionally cre-
ated causes of action.41 The Supreme Court has hinted broadly that 
it borrows state law primarily to avoid what it views as judicial legis-
lation. As the Court's discussion in Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency42 suggests, a limitation period is the result of a balance of 
the plaintiff's right to recover, the social policy of repose, and the 
greater accuracy of litigation occurring shortly after the relevant 
events.43 The Court apparently believes, despite its considerable 
use of balancing in other contexts and the prevalence of judicial 
tests requiring the assessment of intangibles,44 that balancing these 
values in order to produce a limitation period is fundamentally a 
legislative function, a function that the judiciary should not per-
form. For example, the Court in one case refused to construct its 
own limitation period, calling such an exercise a "drastic sort of ju-
dicial legislation."45 In a similar vein, Judge Friendly remarked that 
"selection of a period of years [is] not ... the kind of thing judges 
do."46 In short, then, modem federal courts borrow state statutes 
40. See, e.g., Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 260, 266, 269 
{1985). 
41. See Ellen E. Kaulbach, A Functional Approach to Borrowing Limitations Periods for 
Federal Statutes, 11 CAL. L. REv. 133, 137 n.32 (1989) {observing that prior to 1983 "the 
virtually uniform practice was to look to applicable state statutes of limitations") (citing 
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 157 (Scalia, J., concurring)); see also DelCostello v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 {1983} ("[R]esort to state Jaw remains the norm 
for borrowing of limitations periods."). 
42. 421 U.S. 454 {1975). 
43. 421 U.S. at 463-64, 467 n.14, 473. 
44. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
LJ. 943 {1987} (charting the rise of the balancing method in constitutional law). 
45. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 {1966). 
46. MovieColor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 {2d Cir. 1961). 
In hindsight, one can construct a theoretical, although probably ahistorical, justification 
for the evolution of the practice of relying on state limitation periods, namely, that early 
federal courts were filling in a conspicuous gap in federal statutes using the only source avail-
able. This justification works even if the early interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act 
was incorrect, and it might have been in the minds of judges deciding to borrow state law. 
The theoretical explanation relies on two fundamental principles. First, strict time limits 
on how long a plaintiff had to file suit were unknown at common law, which is why causes of 
action require statutes of limitations. "[R]ights in contract and tort recognized in the early 
days of both the Roman and the common law were in theory perpetual." Developments in 
the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAR.v. L. REv. 1177, 1177-78 {1950). Instead, the 
common law used elaborate procedural requirements and the equitable doctrine of )aches to 
limit law and equity actions respectively. Id. at 1178, 1183-85. The reasons for this refusal to 
construct limitation periods are unclear, but they probably involve the same considerations of 
institutional competence discussed in the text. 
Second, judges in the United States, from the nation's founding to the present, have felt a 
strong sense that a cause of action without a limitation period would be "utterly repugnant to 
the genius of our laws." Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch} 336, 342 {1805). Only on the 
rarest of occasions has the Court held that no limitation period applied to a federal statutory 
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of limitations in order to avoid legislating their own limitation 
periods.47 
2. "Overtones and Details": Borrowing State Law on Issues 
Related to the State Statute of Limitations 
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 48 the Supreme Court 
stated that federal courts borrowing a state statute of limitations 
should also borrow state law regarding "the overtones and details 
of application of the state limitation period to federal causes of ac-
tion. "49 The Court explained, 
In virtually all statutes of limitations the chronological length of the 
limitation period is interrelated with provisions regarding tolling, revi-
val, and questions of application. In borrowing a state period of limi-
cause of action. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977) (hold-
ing that no limitation period applied to an EEOC action under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988)). 
When construing a cause of action without a limitation period, courts faced a problem 
they could not solve on their own. A limitation period must come from somewhere, and no 
precedent existed for a court to impose its own time limit. Courts thus sought some legisla-
tive judgment as to the proper balance of repose, accuracy inherent in trials based on fresh 
evidence, and the plaintiff's right to recover. At the time this problem first arose, federal 
statutory law was relatively undeveloped and thus provided few statutory causes of action 
with limitation periods. Courts thus adopted the only remaining option, state statutes of 
limitations. 
Justice Brennan interpreted the early cases borrowing state limitation periods in this way 
in his concurring opinion in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 229 (1958) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan believed that the early decisions adopting state 
statutes of limitations 
represented intensely practical solutions to a practical problem in the administration of 
justice. In the absence of any comparable federal statute of limitations which might be 
applied, the Court had four choices: (1) No period of limitations at all; (2) an arbitrary 
period applicable in all like cases; (3) the flexible but uncertain doctrine of laches; and 
(4) state statutes of limitations. The state statutes were chosen by default. 
357 U.S. at 229. 
For further discussion of the role of the legislative nature of the limitation question, see 
infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. 
47. Justice Scalia has suggested two alternative reasons for continuing the practice. First, 
because federal courts have applied state limitation law to federal statutes since at least 1830, 
M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830), "it is reasonable to say that such a result 
is what Congress must expect, and hence intend," by not explicitly providing a limitation 
period. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 165 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). Second, according to Justice Scalia, borrowing state limitation peri-
ods is more appropriate than the only alternative available to federal courts, borrowing limi-
tation periods from other federal statutes. The reason is that state statutes of limitations 
generally "apply to a whole category of causes of action," while federal periods "are almost 
invariably tied to specific causes of action." 483 U.S. at 168 (Scalia, J., concurring). The 
broader range of the state periods means that the state legislature presumably considered a 
wide variety of fact situations in its balance of the social values of repose, fresh evidence, and 
the plaintiff's right to recover. Congress, on the other hand, balanced these values with only 
a narrow range of fact situations in mind. 483 U.S. at 168-69. For an argument in favor of 
abandoning the automatic practice of borrowing state limitation laws, see Kaulbach, supra 
note 41, at 162-70. 
48. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
49. 421 U.S. at 464. 
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tation for application to a federal cause of action, a federal court is 
relying on the State's wisdom in setting a limit, and exceptions 
thereto, on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim.so 
According to Johnson, then, federal courts should view certain 
principl~s as inseparable from the limitation period. Tolling, appli-
cation, and revival, like the limitation period itself, all depend on a 
state's balancing of the social values of repose and accuracy inher-
ent in speedy trials against preservation of the plaintiff's right to 
recover. A state legislature considering how long to allow a plain-
tiff to sue in a certain cause of action might change the length of the 
contemplated period in response to the applicable principles of toll-
ing, application, and revival. These principles are an integral part 
of the state's balance of values. Therefore, when courts borrow 
state limitation periods to apply to federal causes of action, they 
must also borrow these related principles. 
B. The Reasoning of the Lower Federal Courts 
Although courts borrowing state law to determine the validity 
of plan limitation periods have offered little or no explanation for 
this practice, this section argues that the practice is best described 
as a result of an implicit characterization of modification as a limita-
tion issue akin to other limitation issues, such as tolling, revival, and 
application, that federal courts adopt state law to decide. 
A close examination of those cases holding that federal courts 
should borrow state law to determine the validity of BRISA plan 
limitation periods reveals a dearth of justification for the practice.st 
But reference to closely analogous cases - that is, opinions in law-
50. 421 U.S. at 464. The definition of tolling is simple enough, but what the Court meant 
by application and revival is not clear. Some courts have ruled that questions of relation back 
are application issues to be governed by state law when a federal statute lacks a limitation 
period. See, e.g., Diaz v. Shallbetter, 984 F.2d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 1993); Merritt v. County of 
Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989). Alternatively, the Supreme Court might have 
meant that courts deciding which of several possible state statutes of limitations to borrow 
should consult state law in order to discover which state limitation period .applies to the state 
cause of action most analogous to the federal claim. See, e.g., Central States, S.E. & S.W. 
Areas Pension Fund v. King Dodge, Inc., 835 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1987) (relying on state court 
decisions in deciding which of two possible state statutes of limitations was most analogous to 
an BRISA § 502(a) action); Carpenters Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Bowlus Sch. Supply, 
716 F. Supp. 1232 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (same). 
The word revival probably refers to the circumstances under which an action barred by a 
statute of limitations can be rejuvenated. For instance, a debt that has become unenforceable 
because of the expiration of the limitation period may be renewed by the debtor's new prom-
ise to pay, even if the new promise lacks consideration. JoHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CON· 
TRACTS 230-32 (5th ed. 1987). 
51. One federal district court borrowed state law upholding contractual limitation periods 
and applied a plan limitation period to dismiss a § 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit with the curt observa-
tion, "This Court is aware of no public policy of the United States or Virginia which would 
prevent enforcement of a ... contractual limitation period." Koonan v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 802 F. Supp. 1424, 1425 (E.D. Va. 1992). A second district court upheld an ERISA 
plan limitation period defense after citing and quoting very briefly from the case discussed in 
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suits arising under other federal statutes in which courts have con-
fronted contractual limitation periods - may help elucidate federal 
court decisions in the BRISA context. The most complete explana-
tion for the practice of borrowing state law appears in the 1992 Sev-
enth Circuit decision in Taylor v. Western & Southern Life 
Insurance Co. s2 In Taylor, the Seventh Circuit relied on state law to 
uphold the validity of a contractual limitation period. The case 
arose when dismissed employees sued their employer under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981s3 and other federal statutes, alleging racially moti-
vated discharges.s4 The employees' contracts included a clause 
specifying a six-month limitation period for any suit relating to their 
employment.ss The district court, relying on the contractual limita-
tion period, dismissed the section 1981 claim.s6 The Seventh Circuit 
agreed with the district court that the clause was valid.s7 
The Taylor court began its analysis of whether to consult state or 
federal law to decide the validity of the contractual limitation pe-
riod by noting that the Supreme Court had recently applied to sec-
tion 1981 cases the general practice of borrowing state statutes of 
limitations for federal causes of action.ss The court then quoted the 
Supreme Court's language in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., s9 establishing the principle that federal courts should borrow 
state law regarding "the overtones and details" of the statute of lim-
itations. 60 On the basis of this authority, the Seventh Circuit panel 
concluded that it should borrow state law to decide the validity of 
the contractual limitation period.61 
The court went on to note that federal common l~w already ex-
isted regarding the validity of contractual limitation· periods62 but 
stated that the federal principles were "not so well established, es-
pecially in the context of employment contracts, as to constitute a 
federal rule that must override the application of state law."63 The 
the text immediately following this footnote. Chilcote v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 
841 F. Supp. 877, 879-80 (E.D. Wis. 1993). 
52. 966 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1992). 
53. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1988). 
54. 966 F.2d at 1190. 
55. 966 F.2d at 1190. 
56. 966 F.2d at 1193-94. 
57. 966 F.2d at 1206. 
58. 966 F.2d at 1203 & n.8 (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)). 
59. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
60. 966 F.2d at 1203 (quoting 421 U.S. at 464); see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying 
text (discussing the overtones and details principle). 
61. 966 F.2d at 1203. 
62. 966 F.2d at 1204 (citing Order of United Commercial 11-avelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 
U.S. 586 (1947), in which the Supreme Court upheld a contractual limitation period); see also 
cases cited in supra note 30. 
63. 966 F.2d at 1205. 
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court was unconcerned that borrowing state rules upholding or in-
validating contractual limitation periods would result in interstate 
variation as to the validity of such periods, arguing that "by enact-
ing section 1981 without a statute of limitations, Congress implied 
that it is willing to live with a wide range of state statutes and rules 
governing limitations of actions under section 1981."64 
The Taylor court's approach boils down to three analytic steps. 
First, when a federal statutory cause of action lacks a limitation pe-
riod, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations.65 Second, 
federal courts also borrow state law on issues closely related to the 
applicable state limitation period.66 Third, no congressional policy 
or statute prohibits variation in limitation matters; Congress could 
have prevented interstate variation by providing a limitation pe-
riod, but it chose not to do so. Therefore, courts should borrow 
state law to determine whether to enforce contractual limitation pe-
riods limiting the time available to a plaintiff to sue under a federal 
statutory cause of action when the statute provides no limitation 
period. 
This reasoning includes a conspicuous gap: the practice of bor-
rowing state law governing the tolling, application, and revival of a 
state limitation period provides support for a practice of borrowing 
state law governing the validity of contractual limitation periods 
only if the last issue is fundamentally similar to the other three. 
That is, courts should borrow state law to decide whether to uphold 
or invalidate plan limitation periods only if state law regarding 
modification is also an "overtone" or "detail" of the state statute of 
limitations. The Taylor court did not explain why the state law it 
borrowed was an overtone or detail of the state statute of 
limitations. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the reasoning of the Taylor court 
is dependent on a process of characterization similar to the method 
that courts use in interstate choice of law cases.67 In the interstate 
choice of law context, courts employ a process of characterization 
in order to decide what principles apply to their choice among two 
or more states' laws. For instance, characterizing an issue as one of 
tort law often leads to a presumption in favor of the rule of lex loci 
64. 966 F.2d at 1205 (citing Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
Cange had applied similar reasoning to an action based on the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 
U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988). See also Reynolds Indus. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 618 F. Supp. 419 (D. 
Mass. 1985) (applying similar reasoning in a suit based on the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (expired Sept. 30, 1981)). 
65. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
67. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 7 (1971) (stating that the char-
acterization of a choice of Jaw problem must take place prior to the application of the proper 
Restatement section, and that courts should use forum law to engage in this process). 
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delicti. 68 Those courts following the line of reasoning found in Tay-
lor in determining whether to borrow state law regarding the valid-
ity of contractual limitation periods are likely to have engaged in a 
similar process. By grouping the question of whether the parties 
may modify an otherwise applicable limitation period together with 
issues of tolling, revival, and application, these courts in effect char-
acterized modification as a limitation issue subject to the normal 
limitation practice of borrowing state law. 
C. Understanding Modification as a Separate Issue 
This section argues that the validity of plan- or contract-based 
limitation periods is distinct from limitation law generally, and that 
federal courts therefore should not borrow state modification law 
as an overtone and detail of state limitation law. This section dem-
onstrates that analogous Supreme Court precedent from the inter-
state conflict of law context indicates that a state's judgment on the 
validity of contractual modification should be viewed as quite dif-
ferent from its judgment on the length of the limitation period. 
A state's rules of tolling, revival, and application reflect funda-
mentally different judgments with respect to the values underlying 
statutes of limitations than does a state's rule on contractual modifi-
cation of the statutory limitation period. The overtones and details 
of a state's statute of limitations, as embodied in principles of toll-
ing, revival, and application, supplement the legislature's judgment 
as to the proper balance of values of the competing social interests 
of repose, fresh evidence, and a plaintiff's right to recover. Con-
tractual limitation periods discard that legislative judgment alto-
gether, in favor of a bargain struck by the contracting parties. The 
parties' bargain may depend on their perception of how long they 
can afford to remain exposed to a lawsuit without significant inter-
ference in financial planning, or simply on their relative bargaining 
strengths. These values are quite separate from generalized values 
of repose, fresh evidence, and right to compensation. The question 
of whether contracting parties should be allowed to disregard a leg-
islative balance of values represented by a statute of limitations 
thus resembles laws governing the type of rights that persons may 
bargain away in a contract, or how far the parties may change by 
contract the legal relationship that would have existed between 
them had the contract been silent on a particular issue. 
The Supreme Court has implicitly confirmed the distinction be-
tween modification law and limitation law in Home Insurance Co. v. 
Dick, 69 in which the Court engaged in a process of characterization 
68. Id. § 146. 
69. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
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similar to that which courts use in the interstate choice of law con-
text.70 Dick essentially characterized the ability of the parties to 
shorten a limitation period by contract as an issue of contract law, 
not one of limitation law.71 The Court held that a state court's ap-
plication of a state statute that would have voided the contractual 
limitation period at issue in the case would also have "increase[ d 
the] obligation and impose[ d] a burden not contracted for" upon 
the defendant.72 Although in the Dick Court's view a state could 
"prescribe the kind of remedies to be available in its courts and 
dictate the practice and procedure to be followed in pursuing those 
remedies,"73 the state statute invalidating contractual limitation pe-
riods dealt "neither with the kind of remedy available nor with the 
mode in which it [was] to be pursued."74 Instead, the statute "pur-
port[ ed] to create rights and obligations"75 upon which the con-
tracting parties had not agreed. Thus, the language of Dick 
suggests strongly that the Supreme Court has characterized the is-
sue of the validity of contractual limitation periods as one of con-
tract law, not limitation law. 
A comparison of Dick and another choice of law case from the 
1930s with more recent conflict of law decisions further supports 
the argument that a state's decision regarding the validity of con-
tractual limitation periods is a separate judgment from its decision 
as to the length of the statute of limitations. In the two early cases 
- Dick and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine 
Land Co. 76 - the Supreme Court held that state courts could not 
apply forum law invalidating contractual limitation periods when 
the contract at issue was executed and to be performed in other 
states. In Delta & Pine the Supreme Court held that a fifteen-
month limitation period contained in an insurance contract placed a 
condition upon the liability of the insurance company.77 Because 
this provision was valid in the state in which the parties executed 
the contract and in which the contract was to be performed, the 
70. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
71. Cf. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLicr OF LAWS§ 7(1) (1971) (defining charac-
terization as "[t]he classification and interpretation of legal concepts and terms"). 
Contract law is the body of principles governing whether the terms of "a promise (are] 
enforceable at law directly or indirectly." 1 ARnruR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 3 
(1952). Limitation law is the body of principles deciding at what point the law will "foreclose 
judicial action by virtue of expiration of allotted time." 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION 
OF AcnoNs § 1.1 (1991). Notice that on its face, the issue of the validity of contractual 
limitation periods could fit comfortably within eitlier category. 
72. 281 U.S. at 409. 
73. 281 U.S. at 409. 
74. 281 U.S. at 410. 
75. 281 U.S. at 410. 
76. 292 U.S. 143 (1934). 
77. 292 U.S. at 149. 
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forum state of the insured's lawsuit could not apply its own statute 
invalidating the contractual modification without enlarging the in-
sured's contractual rights, a result the Court held to be prohibited 
by the Due Process Clause.78 Similarly, in Dick, the Court reversed 
a forum state's attempt to apply its own law prohibiting contractual 
modification of the state's statute of limitations when the contract 
at issue was made and was to be performed in Mexico.79 
The Supreme Court integrated both Delta & Pine and Dick into 
its modem choice of law jurisprudence in the 1964 case Clay v. Sun 
Insurance Office. 80 The Court interpreted the two early cases as 
resting on a requirement that a forum state have minimum contacts 
to the parties, the transaction, and the litigation before a state court 
could apply forum law invalidating a contractual limitation period. 
Thus, in Clay, the Court held that a forum state could apply its own 
statute nullifying contractual limitation periods because the forum 
had "ample contacts with the present transaction and the parties."81 
The Court distinguished Delta & Pine and Dick on the ground that 
in those cases "the activities in the State of the forum were thought 
to be too slight and too casual [or even wholly lacking] to make the 
application of local law consistent with due process."82 Taken to-
gether, then, Clay, Delta & Pine, and Dick stand for the principle 
that a court may apply a forum law invalidating a contractual limi-
tation period only when the forum has at least minimum contacts 
with the parties, the transaction, and the litigation. 
The significance of this principle for the analysis of borrowing 
state limitation law becomes clear when one compares Clay, Delta 
& Pine, and Dick to the more recent decision in Sun Oil Co. v. 
Wortman. 83 In Wortman, the Supreme Court held that a forum 
state could constitutionally characterize its statute of limitations as 
procedural for choice of law purposes.84 The Wortman holding 
means that a forum court can apply its own statute of limitations to 
a lawsuit even in the absence of the minimum contacts necessary to 
allow the court constitutionally to apply forum law to other issues 
in the same lawsuit.ss 
78. 292 U.S. at 150 (construing U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 1). 
79. 281 U.S. at 410. 
80. 377 U.S. 179 (1964). 
81. 377 U.S. at 183. 
82. 377 U.S. at 181-82 (citation omitted). 
83. 486 U.S. 717 {1988). 
84. The eight Justices participating in the case were unanimous on this point. See 486 
U.S. at 722-29, 737, 743. 
85. Justice Scalia, writing for a five-person majority, adhered to the view that "a statute of 
limitations may be treated as procedural and thus may be governed by forum law even when 
the substance of the claim must be governed by another State's law." 486 U.S. at 723. 
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Reading Wortman together with Clay, Delta & Pine, and Dick 
leads to the conclusion that a state court may apply the forum 
state's statute of limitations to a lawsuit in the absence of minimum 
contacts, but the state must have minimum contacts to apply forum 
law regarding the ability of contracting parties to modify a statute 
of limitations. This conclusion suggests that under the Supreme 
Court's current jurisprudence a state's judgment regarding the abil-
ity of contracting parties to specify their own limitation periods is a 
fundamentally different decision from the state's judgment as to the 
length of the limitation period. If the two state judgments were es-
sentially the same decision, then the Supreme Court should have 
applied the same minimum contacts requirement to a forum court's 
application of forum law with respect to both the statute of limita-
tions and the validity of contractual modifications of the statute. 
Thus, reason and precedent both suggest that state laws prohib-
iting or upholding contractual limitation periods are not like state 
rules on tolling, application, and revival. Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency86 teaches that the latter principles are part and parcel 
of the state's statute of limitations itself; a state's judgment on the 
length of the limitation period is inseparably related to its judg-
ments on tolling, revival, and application.87 But Wortman, Clay, 
Delta & Pine, and Dick suggest exactly the opposite for the validity 
of contractual limitation periods; state law on this issue is not part 
and parcel of the state's statute of limitations.88 Thus, federal 
courts should not borrow state law regarding the validity of contrac-
tual modifications of limitation periods as part of the general prac-
tice of borrowing state statutes of limitations to apply to federal 
causes of action lacking limitation periods. 
86. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
87. 421 U.S. at 462-63. 
88. It is true of course that these cases are choice of law cases decided under the Due 
Process Clause, U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. 
CoNST. art. IV, § 1, and that they do not mention the federal court practice of borrowing 
state law on limitation issues. But the inquiry is nevertheless the same: whether the state's 
judgment on one issue is inseparably related to the state's decision on the other. 
One might also argue that Delta & Pine and Dick are no longer good law after Wortman. 
Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-09 & n.11 (1981) (criticizing Delta & Pine's 
reliance on the traditional rule that the law of the place of contracting governs the interpreta-
tion of contracts). But the Wortman Court did not cite Dick at all, and it referred to Delta & 
Pine only in passing. 486 U.S. at 728 n.2, 740. The Supreme Court rarely overrules a case 
without mentioning it explicitly. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980) 
(discussing the force of the doctrine of stare decisis). Furthermore, just three years before 
Wortman, the Court cited and relied on Dick in another choice of law decision. See Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822-23 (1985). In addition, lower federal courts and 
judges continue to treat Dick as good law. See, e.g., Soo Line R.R. v. Overton, 992 F.2d 640, 
649 n.7 (7th Cir. 1993) (Ripple, J., dissenting); Thorton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 886 F.2d 85, 89 
(4th Cir. 1989); Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1988); Republic of 
Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 821 F. Supp. 292, 294 (D.NJ. 1993); Superfos Invs., 
Ltd. v. First Miss. Fertilizer, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 450, 454 (S.D. Miss. 1992). 
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II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND BRISA PREEMPTION 
Although Part I argued that courts cannot justify borrowing 
state law regarding modification as part and parcel of state limita-
tion law, this argument alone is not enough to lead to the conclu-
sion that federal courts should not borrow state law to govern the 
enforceability of BRISA plan limitation periods; the federal court 
practice of adopting state law is not limited to statutes of limita-
tions. Federal courts borrow state law in a wide variety of legal 
contexts, and state statutes of limitations are only one of a number 
of categories of state law that federal courts incorporate in enor-
mously different legal contexts for many different reasons. Yet in 
other situations, federal courts have deliberately chosen to ignore 
state law in favor of a uniform national rule. Deciding whether fed-
eral courts should borrow state law to answer the section 
502(a)(1)(B) modification question, then, requires a more general 
look at the federal court use of state law in cases arising under fed-
eral causes of action. This Part and Part III analyze the federal 
court use of state law and apply the resulting principles to the 
BRISA section 502(a)(1)(B) modification question. 
When a federal court engages in common lawmaking to fill a 
gap in a federal statute, it should first look to any relevant source to 
see if Congress has expressed a discernible intent in the area.89 This 
rule stems from the respective roles of Congress and the judiciary in 
our federal system. As the Supreme Court stated in 1979, "[I]n 
fashioning federal principles to govern areas left open by Congress, 
our function is to effectuate congressional policy."90 This rule ap-
plies with full force to any context in which a court is deciding 
whether to borrow state law or to construct a uniform national rule. 
Congress can, for instance, create its own uniform national rule in 
any particular area simply by specifying the content of that rule in a 
statute. Congress can also direct federal courts to formulate federal 
common law in a particular area instead of borrowing state law.91 
Congress can also require courts to incorporate as rules of decision 
an entire area of state law, even if that area is in constant evolu-
89. See Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REv. 303, 
320 (1992) (describing federal common lawmaking in the context of federal statutes as "judi-
cial lawmaking - or filling in of enacted law - in pursuance of congressional intent"). 
90. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 738 (1979). 
91. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 arguably contains such an instruction. See FED. R 
EVID. 501. Rule 501 directs federal courts to create a common law of privilege; although 
state law may be instructive, few courts if any have understood Rule 501 to permit them 
simply to borrow the local state's rule of privilege. See 2 DAVID W. Lou1sELL & CHRISTO-
PHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201 (1978); see also 28 u.s.c. § 1651 (1988) 
(granting federal courts the power to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law"). 
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tion.92 Finally, Congress can leave the decision of whether to bor-
row state law entirely to the federal courts' discretion.93 
Accordingly, federal courts should follow any discernible congres-
sional intent when deciding whether to borrow state law regarding 
the BRISA modification question. 
This Part argues that BRISA section 514(a)'s94 broad preemp-
tion of state law provides substantial evidence that Congress in-
tended for federal courts to ignore state law when filling in gaps in 
BRISA. Nevertheless, this Part argues that preemption alone does 
not warrant a definitive conclusion that federal courts should con-
struct a uniform national rule regarding plan limitation periods. 
Such caution is necessary for two reasons. First, the section 514(a) 
argument developed here may not apply to procedural questions. 
Second, federal courts do borrow state law to fill in some gaps in 
some federal statutes containing preemption clauses, most notably 
in section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.95 
92. See, e.g., Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988) (borrowing the entirety of 
state criminal law to apply to federal bases and enclaves in the absence of applicable federal 
law). The Supreme Court upheld the Assimilative Crimes Act against a nondelegation doc-
trine challenge in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294 (1958). 
Read literally, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) might constitute an example of a congressional 
command to borrow state law. Section 1988 provides that when existing federal law is "not 
adapted" to the protection of civil rights, 
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State 
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the 
same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be 
extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not construed or applied 
§ 1988 consistently. In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), for example, the Court 
held that § 1988 "instructs us to tum to state law" to decide whether an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) survived the death of the plaintiff, "unless an 'inconsistency' with fed-
eral law is found" to exist; indeed, the Court posed the question in terms of whether a federal 
court was "required [by§ 1988] to adopt [state law]." 436 U.S. at 585, 593 & n.11 (emphasis 
added). In several other cases, however, the Court has seemed oblivious to § 1988 in § 1983 
cases. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (ignoring both state law and § 1988 
while constructing a rule of damages in § 1983 cases involving denials of procedural due 
process in schools). Note that the Court decided Robertson and Carey in the same term. 
Robertson may suggest a way to justify the result in Taylor v. Western & Southern Life 
Insurance Co., 966 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1992), discussed supra in notes 52-68 and accompany-
ing text. Recall that the earlier discussion criticized Taylor for assuming that modification 
law was an overtone or detail of limitation law as a justification for borrowing state law to 
uphold a contractual modification of the limitation period applicable to a suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). One might argue instead that § 1988 expressed Congress's intent that 
federal courts borrow state law to fill gaps in § 1981. If so, the mistake was in borrowing 
state law to decide the modification question outside the § 1988 context, as the Seventh Cir-
cuit appeared to do in Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1987). 
93. See, e.g., Board of County Commrs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-52 (1939) 
(holding that Congress by "not specifically provid[ing] for the present contingency," had left 
the judiciary "free to take into account appropriate considerations of 'public convenience' " 
in deciding what law to apply). 
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
95. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1988). 
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The text, legislative history, and statutory structure of BRISA 
are of little help in deciding whether to borrow state law to uphold 
or invalidate plan limitation periods.96 BRISA section 514(a), how-
ever, does provide some basis for concluding that Congress in-
tended, or would have intended had it thought about the matter, for 
federal courts to ignore state law when deciding the validity of 
BRISA plan modifications. Section 514(a) preempts all state law 
that "relates to"97 an BRISA plan. Congress employs preemption 
clauses like section 514(a) to remove the possibility that state law 
will govern the relevant area. It would be quite odd for federal 
courts, perceiving that Congress used the device of preemption to 
make state law inapplicable to BRISA issues, nevertheless to adopt 
state law as the rule of decision regarding plan modifications. Bor-
rowing state law in this context would appear to flaunt congres-
sional intent that state law not govern BRISA plan issues. Thus, 
the purpose behind section 514(a) seems to require federal courts 
to construct a uniform national rule to decide the validity of plan 
limitation periods.9s 
This argument has considerable force, but it is not conclusive for 
two reasons. First, the argument depends entirely upon characteriz-
ing the issue of the validity of plan limitation periods as substantive 
rather than procedural. Preemption clauses do not affect state pro-
cedural law, at least not when the lawsuit is filed in state court. 
Plaintiffs may file an BRISA section S02(a)(l)(B) lawsuit in state or 
federal court,99 yet no one would argue that section 514(a) requires 
state courts adjudicating a section 502(a)(l)(B) action to follow the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plans are subject to variations in 
state procedural law even if federal courts refuse to borrow state 
96. Justice White briefly noted the modification question in a footnote in a dissent to an 
opinion deciding a different issue regarding a different federal statute. See UAW v. Hoosier 
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 711 n.2 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the Supreme 
Court presumably would support establishing a uniform federal rule regarding the enforce-
ability of contractual modifications of limitation periods applicable to suits under Labor 
Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988)). The legislative history of ERISA 
increases the relevance of White's footnote to the§ 502(a)(l)(B) modification question be-
cause Congress apparently used § 301 as a model for § 502(a)(l)(B). See H.R. CoNF. REP. 
No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5107 (stating 
that courts should treat BRISA§ 502(a) actions like§ 301 actions). Nevertheless, because 
Justice White's statement represents the views of a dissenting justice commenting on a differ-
ent statute, it probably carries little weight in the context of§ 502(a)(l)(B) suits. 
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
· 98. The Supreme Court's decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 
(1989), provides some support for this interpretation of § 514(a). In Firestone, the Court 
relied heavily on the general common law of trusts to choose a standard of review for 
§ 502(a)(l)(B) actions challenging benefit eligibility decisions. 489 U.S. at 110-15. The 
Court did not refer to the law of any particular state, nor did it mention the option of borrow-
ing state law. This omission perhaps reflects some recognition of the oddness of borrowing 
state rules in the presence of a preemption clause as broad as§ 514(a). 
99. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (1988). 
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law on any BRISA problem, because a section 502(a)(l)(B) plain-
tiff can always file in state court. Thus, section 514(a) prohibits fed-
eral courts from borrowing state law to decide the validity of plan 
limitation periods only if the issue is substantive.100 
The division between substance and procedure is a treacherous 
area, and the Supreme Court has struggled with the distinction re-
peatedly.101 This Note has already argued that the validity of plan 
limitation periods presents a substantive issue of contract law; con-
tractual modifications clearly present a substantive issue in the 
interstate choice of law context.102 But the Supreme Court has 
warned that what is substantive in one context may not be substan-
tive in another.1°3 Thus, to the extent that courts consider modi-
100. The Supreme Court's discussion of § 514(a) in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 
498 U.S. 133 (1990), states this point almost exactly: 
Section 514(a) was intended to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a 
uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial 
burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the 
Federal Government. Otherwise, the inefficiencies created could work to the detriment 
of plan beneficiaries .... Particularly disruptive is the potential for conflict in substantive 
law. It is foreseeable that state courts, exercising their common law powers, might de-
velop different substantive standards applicable to the same employer conduct, requiring 
the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each juris-
diction. Such an outcome is fundamentally at odds with the goal of uniformity that Con-
gress sought to implement. 
498 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added). 
Courts have disagreed on the proper characterization of the issue of the validity of con· 
tractual limitation periods. Compare, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 
309 S.E.2d 152, 158 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (characterizing contractual modifications as raising 
substantive issues) with Jordan v. Texaco, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1140, 1142 (W.D. Okla. 1969) 
(characterizing contractual modifications as raising procedural issues). 
The Ingersoll-Rand Court's reference to administrative and financial burdens suggests the 
possibility of a response to the argument that § 514(a) expresses a congressional desire of 
uniformity only on substantive as opposed to procedural issues. The response runs as fol-
lows: Congress passed§ 514(a) to minimize administrative and financial burdens that vary-
ing state laws would impose upon ERISA plans. Administrative and financial burdens can 
result from variations in state procedural as well as substantive law. Accordingly, courts 
should concentrate not on an abstract line between substance and procedure, but rather on 
whether variations in state law on a particular issue would place undue administrative and 
financial burdens on plans. Section III.C.2 of this Note briefly examines the administrative 
and financial burdens that variation in state law on the validity of plan limitation periods 
would place on plan administrators. 
This response has some force, but Congress apparently intended to subject plans to the 
burdens of variations in state procedural law by allowing state courts concurrent jurisdiction 
over § 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits, apparently believing that the benefits of allowing plan benefi-
ciaries a choice of forum justified the resulting cost to plans. 
101. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that states may treat 
statutes of limitations as procedural when facing an interstate conflict of laws); UAW v. Hoo-
sier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 n.4 (1966) (refusing to decide whether statutes of limi-
tations are substantive or procedural in the context of § 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act and recognizing the limited utility of the term "substantive"); Guaranty 'Ifust 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945) (refusing to decide whether statutes of limitations are 
substantive or procedural). 
102. See supra notes 69-88 and accompanying text. 
103. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("The line between 'substance' 
and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context changes."). 
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fl.cation law procedural, section 514(a)'s expression of a 
congressional desire for uniformity may not apply to the BRISA 
modification issue. 
Moreover, preemption has never stopped federal courts from 
borrowing some categories of state law, most notably state statutes 
of limitations. For instance, section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act104 preempts state law affecting collective-bargaining 
agreements.105 Yet the Supreme Court held in UAW v. Hoosier 
Cardinal Corp.106 that federal courts should borrow state statutes of 
limitations in certain types of section 301 lawsuits.101 Congressional 
desire for uniformity has not been dispositive on this issue.1os This 
argument in turn suggests the need for a more general analysis of 
the various reasons that federal courts borrow state law, to deter-
mine if any of these reasons support a similar practice regarding the 
BRISA modification question. The next Part proceeds with this 
more general analysis. 
III. INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 
AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
This Part examines the plan limitation period question as an ex-
ercise in federal common lawmaking.109 As several commentators 
104. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1988). 
105. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). 
106. 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966). 
107. The Hoosier court believed that the congressional desire for uniformity in labor law 
did not extend to limitation periods: 
The need for uniformity ..• is greatest where its absence would threaten the smooth 
functioning of those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to 
promote . . . . For the most part, statutes of limitations come into play only when those 
processes have already broken down. Lack of uniformity in this area is therefore un-
likely to frustrate in any important way the achievement of any significant goal of labor 
policy. 
383 U.S. at 702. 
In addition, lower federal courts continue to borrow state limitation periods in 
§ 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits without considering§ 514(a). See cases cited supra note 19. 
108. For a discussion of why federal courts follow the borrowing practice in the case of 
limitation periods, see supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. 
It might be more accurate to say that federal courts will find some reasons sufficient to 
strain to find a congressional desire for uniformity, as expressed in a preemption statute, 
inapplicable to the precise issue presented in a particular case. Courts may in essence be 
arguing that Congress would not have intended for uniformity to exist on this issue had it 
thought about the matter. The language of Hoosier quoted supra in note 107 supports this 
more charitable characterization of the Court's holding in that case. 
Alternatively, perhaps Hoosier's holding, when placed alongside § 30l's preemption of 
state substantive law, illustrates that the Court believes that statutes of limitations are in fact 
procedural, despite the Court's repeated attempts to avoid the issue. See supra note 101 and 
accompanying text. If so, then Hoosier represents nothing more than a specific example of 
the substantive versus procedural division discussed supra in notes 99-103 and accompanying 
text. · 
109. Some commentators argue that federal common lawmaking is an illegitimate usur-
pation of legislative power by the judiciary. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
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have noted, federal common lawmaking in the context of a federal 
statute can represent a hybrid between statutory interpretation and 
judicial construction of a rule of decision.110 Accordingly, this Part 
Powers of the Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 {1985); Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial 
Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REv. 327 {1992) (hereinafter Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative]; 
Martin H. Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 18 MICH, 
L. REv. 959 {1980); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: 
A Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 853 {1989); Martin H. Redish, Federal 
Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretative Process: An "Institutionalist" Per-
spective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761 {1989) [hereinafter Redish, "Institutionalist" Perspective]. 
But see, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805 {1989) (arguing 
for a broad federal common lawmaking power). 
Those scholars labeling federal common lawmaking illegitimate, however, do not dispute 
the practice of filling gaps in federal statutes via a process they label "statutory interpreta-
tion," and under their definitions, federal courts legitimately could fill the gap in ERISA 
regarding the validity of plan limitation periods by either borrowing state law or constructing 
a uniform national rule. Professor Merrill, arguing against the legitimacy of federal common 
lawmaking, defines statutory interpretation to include a federal court's duty to resolve an 
"implicit delegation,'' a term which in tum subsumes "cases where Congress leaves an inter-
nal gap in a statute creating a federal cause of action, i.e., a gap that must be resolved in 
order to decide a case which Congress has directed the courts to hear." Merrill, The Judicial 
Prerogative, supra, at 354-55. Merrill does not elaborate, but this definition on its face would 
seem to cover the issue of the validity of plan limitation periods. 
Similarly, Professor Redish, the scholar arguing perhaps most vehemently against a fed-
eral common lawmaking power, distinguishes between federal common law and statutory 
interpretation. See Redish, "Institutionalist" Perspective, supra, at 767 n.23. Redish 
continues, 
In certain instances, although a statute clearly applies, the statute's text is silent on a 
collateral issue which must be resolved one way or the other. In such cases, it is incum-
bent upon an interpreting court to resolve the issue in the manner most consistent with 
attainment of the policies sought to be achieved by the statute. Here, the court properly 
performs its "gap-filling" function. 
Id. at 785 {footnote omitted). Redish defines legitimate gap-filling as deciding issues "that 
must be resolved before the statute may be applied - in other words, where not to decide 
the issue is effectively to decide it." Id. at 795. This definition is distinctly unhelpful because 
it fits issues that Redish later uses as examples of illegitimate federal common lawmaking, 
including the existence of implied causes of action. See id. at 795-96. Nevertheless, the tone 
of Redish's discussion on gap-filling suggests that in his view, courts may legitimately con-
struct law to solve unforeseeable issues in the context of lawsuits based on federal statutory 
causes of action, see id. at 785, 794-95, and this description fits the § 502{a)(l){B) modifica-
tion question. 
In addition, a federal court's decision to borrow or to ignore state law in deciding the 
validity of plan limitation periods would probably fit within the definition of "judicial law-
making under the authority of enacted Jaw" espoused by Professor Kramer. See Larry 
Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REv. 263, 268 {1992). 
110. See, e.g., PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 863 {3d ed. 1988) (hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] {"The demarca-
tion between 'statutory interpretation' or 'constitutional interpretation,' on the one hand, 
and judge-made Jaw on the other, is not a sharp line. Statutory interpretation shades into 
judicial lawmaking on a spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative purpose with respect to 
the basic issue at hand attenuates."); Weinberg, supra note 109, at 835 ("(T]here is no funda-
mental difference between statutory interpretation ... and judicial lawmaking •••. "): Peter 
Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, ls There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. 
REv. 311, 332 {1980) ("The difference between 'common law' and 'statutory interpretation' is 
a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind."). 
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uses the tools of both methods to argue that federal courts should 
adopt a uniform national rule upholding plan limitation periods.111 
This Part proceeds in three steps. Section III.A argues that no 
useful background presumption exists in the case law either favor-
ing or opposing recourse to state law to fill gaps in federal statutes. 
Section III.B introduces a more narrow focus, identifying a list of 
factors that federal courts use when deciding whether to borrow 
state law. Section III.C then applies these factors to the BRISA 
plan limitation period question. In applying these factors, section 
III.C also makes clear that the decision whether to adopt a uniform 
national rule necessarily implicates the question whether the rule 
should uphold or invalidate plan periods. This Part answers both 
questions, concluding that federal courts should adopt a uniform 
national rule upholding the application of plan limitation periods to 
section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits, so long as the plan period provides a 
reasonable length of time for a lawsuit. 
A. Inconclusive Background Presumptions 
In some types of cases involving relations between state and fed-
eral law, the Supreme Court employs background presumptions 
designed to help decide specific cases while simultaneously protect-
ing values important to the U.S. legal system generally. For in-
stance, the Court construes federal statutes with a presumption 
against the preemption of state law,112 and the Court employs a 
strong presumption that when Congress creates a statutory cause of 
action it intends to give state courts concurrent jurisdiction to hear 
cases arising under that statute.113 Both presumP.tions are designed 
to protect the role of state law and state courts in the federal sys-
tem. With respect to the question of whether to borrow state law to 
fill gaps in federal statutes, however, the Supreme Court has made 
conflicting statements about the existence of a general presumption 
for or against borrowing state law. 
Two cases decided approximately twenty-five months apart re-
veal the conflict. In 1989, the Supreme Court handed down Missis-
sippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,114 a case requiring the 
Court to formulate a definition of the word domicile under the In-
111. Professor Martha Field perhaps best captures the spirit of the methodology in this 
Part with her phrase "judicial lawmaking - or filling in of enacted law - in pursuance of 
congressional intent." See Field, supra note 89, at 320. 
112. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
113. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876). For another example of such a 
presumption, see Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (requiring 
an explicit statement from Congress of its intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment). 
114. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
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dian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).11s In responding to one 
party's argument that the Court should borrow state definitions of 
domicile, the Court stated, "We start ... with the general assump-
tion that 'in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary . . . 
Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of 
the federal act dependent on state law.' "116 The Court continued, 
"One reason for this rule of construction is that federal statutes are 
generally intended to have uniform nationwide application. . . . A 
second reason for the presumption against the application of state 
law is the danger that 'the federal program would be impaired if 
state law were to control.' "117 
Just two years later, however, the Court flatly contradicted the 
Choctaw Indians presumption. In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Serv-
ices, Inc., 118 the Court faced the question of "whether we should 
fashion a federal common law rule obliging the representative 
shareholder in a derivative action founded on the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 ... to make a demand on the board of directors 
even when such a demand would be excused as futile under state 
law.''119 The Court recognized that the question it faced was fed-
eral in nature,120 but nevertheless decided to borrow state law to 
decide it.121 In reaching this conclusion, the Court began with a 
115. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988). 
116. 490 U.S. at 43 (second omission in original) (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 
U.S. 101, 104 (1943)). 
117. 490 U.S. at 43-44 (quoting Jerome, 318 U.S. at 104). 
The Court also articulated two additional reasons against borrowing state law, but ap-
peared to rely rather heavily on its background presumption against borrowing state law to 
decide the case. The Court's first alternative argument was that Congress could not have 
intended to allow the states to define a term crucial to the ICWA's implementation because 
states had themselves caused many of the problems that Congress passed the ICWA to cor-
rect. 490 U.S. 44-45; see infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. The Court's second rea-
son for refusing to borrow state law was that variations in state law would invariably lead to 
different results for cases in which the crucial events happened in different states, and that 
parties might choose states in order to obtain the benefit of a certain state's rules. 490 U.S. at 
45-46; see infra notes 159-60. 
The Court might have done better to rely on the traditional supremacy of the federal 
government in relations with Native Americans. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, 424-27 (1964) (relying on the federal government's traditional supremacy on 
international matters to ignore state law in creating a federal common law act of state doc-
trine). Alternatively, the Court might have held that the area of child custody jurisdiction 
required uniform law. See, e.g., The Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A (1988); UNIF. CHILD CuSTODY Juruso1cnoN Acr, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1988). But cf. De 
Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956) (indicating that the area of domestic law is 
one traditionally reserved for the states). See generally infra notes 125-31 and accompanying 
text (explaining the importance of spheres of traditional state or federal influence in deciding 
whether to borrow state law). 
118. 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
119. 500 U.S. at 92 (construing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(a)-65 (1988)) (citation omitted). 
120. 500 U.S. at 97. 
121. 500 U.S. at 98-107. 
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clear statement of a background presumption in favor of borrowing 
state law to fill gaps in federal statutes: 
Our cases indicate that a court should endeavor to fill the interstices 
of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal rules only when the 
scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal 
standards, or when express provisions in analogous statutory schemes 
embody congressional policy choices readily applicable to the matter 
at hand. Otherwise, we have indicated that federal courts should "in-
corporat[ e] [state law] as the federal rule of decision," unless "appli-
cation of [the particular] state law [in question] would frustrate 
specific objectives of the federal programs."122 
A clearer articulation of a background presumption in favor of bor-
rowing state law, and against the principle of Choctaw Indians, is 
difficult to imagine. In the absence of a consistent presumption in 
favor of or against borrowing state law, courts must proceed with a 
closer analysis of the factors which affect the relationship between 
state and federal law. 
B. Factors Governing Whether a Federal Court Should Borrow 
State Law 
The choice between borrowing state law and constructing a uni-
form national rule is present in a vast variety of factual and legal 
contexts. Because of the situational variety of the cases, any at-
tempt to construct a definitive set of rules governing when federal 
courts should borrow state law will likely be futile. Instead, this 
section follows the methodology of Professor Martha Field by seek-
ing to identify a list of factors that the Supreme Court has relied on 
in deciding whether to borrow state law.123 Section III.C will ex-
122. 500 U.S. at 98 (citations omitted} (alterations in original} (quoting United States v. 
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)). The Court also made clear that the presump-
tion it articulated was generally applicable to all federal statutes by stating that "[t]he pre-
sumption that state law should be incorporated into federal common law is particularly 
strong" in certain areas of the law. 500 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added}. Note that Kamen did 
not even cite Choctaw Indians, much less explicitly overrule it. 
In describing the conflicting holdings and doctrines characteristic of the federal common 
law, Professor Kramer has stated, "In truth, there is something for everyone in the decided 
cases, and it doesn't take a whole lot of ingenuity to deconstruct any position and show that 
the exceptions are really the rule and vice versa." Kramer, supra note 109, at 277. This 
observation seems particularly applicable here. 
123. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARv. L. REv. 883, 953-62 (1986). Professor Field focused her article elsewhere, so her list 
of factors is incomplete. Nevertheless, this methodology is superior to attempts to construct 
a simple test to cover all cases involving the possibility of borrowing state law. See, e.g., 
Theresa C. O'Loughlin, Note, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Pro-
posed Test, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 823, 830 (1976) (advocating a three-part test looking to "the 
need for uniformity in operating the federal program, the presence of an area of traditionally 
local concern, and the existence of conflict between the state law and the federal program"). 
The enormous variety of the factual and legal situations to which the borrowing practice 
might apply likely dooms to failure any attempt to mold the cases into a single test. 
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amine whether those factors counsel for or against absorbing state 
law to decide the validity of plan limitation periods.124 
1. Traditional State Governance 
One factor the Supreme Court has looked to in deciding 
whether to borrow state law is whether the case involves a legal 
arena traditionally dominated by state law. An example of the im-
portance of tradition is De Sylva v. Ballentine, 125 a case requiring 
the Court to construe the word children in a federal copyright stat-
ute.126 The Court stated that borrowing state law was especially 
appropriate "where a statute deals with a familial relationship; 
there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a 
124. AU of th_e factors listed below are in varying degrees reversible. That is, if the pres· 
ence of a specific factor suggests that courts should ignore state law, then its absence also 
suggests that courts should borrow state law. For instance, a tradition of state governance 
over a particular area suggests that courts should borrow state law, and a tradition of federal 
governance suggests that courts should ignore state law. See infra notes 125-31 and accompa· 
nying text. 
Nevertheless, the strength of each factor as compared to its opposite will vary from factor 
to factor and from case to case. For instance, the fact that Congress has given federal district 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over a certain type of suit is a relatively strong indication that 
courts should ignore state law, see infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text, but the absence 
of exclusive district court jurisdiction - that is, concurrent jurisdiction - might not be such 
a strong indicator in favor of state law because most suits under federal statutes may be 
brought in either state or federal court. Cf. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) 
(explaining that courts should presume that Congress intends for state courts to exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction over suits arising under federal statutes absent some indication to the 
contrary). As the above example illustrates, the strength of a factor's "opposite" may well 
depend on what the normal or default doctrine is in the particular area. That is, the fact that 
a statutory cause of action is subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts may be 
a weak indicator because concurrent jurisdiction is so common. Similarly, the strength of the 
factor consisting of the presence or absence of forum shopping difficulties, see infra notes 
159-60 and accompanying text, depends on how prevalent forum shopping problems are in 
lawsuits in general. 
1\vo other explanations are necessary. First, each factor will vary in strength and impor-
tance from case to case, and courts deciding whether to borrow state law should carefully 
examine the real-world consequences of their choice. See Mishkin, supra note 1, at 814-32 
(illustrating principles in this area by analyzing the costs and benefits of borrowing state law 
in five specific case studies). Section lli.C.2 of this Note provides an analysis of the conse· 
quences of a decision to borrow or ignore state law governing whether plan limitation peri-
ods are valid. 
Second, the factors listed below are not hermetically sealed packets; in some cases, they 
may blend together and as such could be difficult to distinguish. For instance, "traditional 
state governance," "expectation interests of private parties," and "interference in state regu-
lation and regulatory judgments" are identified separately, although in some cases private 
parties might reasonably rely on a highly developed body of state regulations and regulatory 
judgments because state law traditionally has dominated the area of law. See infra notes 125· 
31, 138-40, 141-44, and accompanying text. Likewise, "complexity of federal common law" 
and "lack of information" are listed separately, even though courts are probably more likely 
to find that they lack the information necessary to do a good job on their own when ignoring 
state law would require courts to construct a complex body of federal common law. See infra 
notes 132-34, 135-37, and accompanying text. 
125. 351 U.S. 570 (1956). 
126. 351 U.S. at 571-72 (construing Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 1, § 24, 61 Stat. 652, 659 
(repealed 1978)). 
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matter of state concem."127 Similarly, in Reconstruction Finance 
Corp. v. Beaver County, 128 the Court borrowed state law to define 
the term real property as used in a federal statute, in part because 
"[c]oncepts of real property are deeply rooted in state traditions, 
customs, habits, and laws."129 Language in other cases further indi-
cates that the Court considers tradition an important factor in de-
ciding whether to borrow state law.130 
The flipside of this factor is that courts should be reluctant to 
borrow state law in areas traditionally reserved by the federal gov-
ernment. The tradition of federal preeminence in international and 
military affairs has led the Court to construct federal common law 
in diversity cases involving those areas of law,131 and there is no 
127. 351 U.S. at 580; see also Mishkin, supra note 1, at 822 (arguing that the Court was 
correct to borrow state law in De Sylva, in part because of the traditional dominance of state 
law in the area of domestic relations). 
128. 328 U.S. 204 {1946). 
129. 328 U.S. at 210 (construing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, ch. 8, § 10, 
47 Stat. 5, 9-10 {1932), amended by Act of June 10, 1941, ch. 190, § 3, 55 Stat. 248, 248). In a 
later case, the Court characterized the holding in Beaver County as an example of congres-
sional consent "to application of state law ... through failure to make other provisions con-
cerning matters ordinarily so governed." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309 
(1947) (emphasis added). 
130. See, e.g., United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241-42 {1960) (adopting state law to 
govern the extinguishing of federal tax liens in part because "when Congress resorted to the 
use of liens, it came into an area of complex property relationships long since settled and 
regulated by state law"); see also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (borrowing 
state law to determine the right of a mortgagee to rents and profits from the land of a bank-
rupt mortgagor in part because "[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law"). 
But see Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 {1989) (refusing to 
borrow state law in a case involving child custody, an area of law traditionally dominated by 
state law). · 
131. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964) (relying in a 
diversity case on the constitutional underpinnings of the act of state doctrine to decide a case 
posing questions under that doctrine according to federal, not state, law); United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947) (constructing federal common law because "the 
government-soldier relation [is] distinctively and exclusively a creation of federal law"). 
Note that both of these examples involved an application of federal common law in diversity 
cases, not in cases in which the area of law was dominated by a federal statute. The subtle 
difference between state law that governs of its own force and state law that federal courts 
borrow is often significant in other contexts. When state law governs of its own force, as it 
does when federal courts sit in diversity, a federal court must normally follow the whole of 
state law regardless of that law's content. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); · 
Mishkin, supra note 1, at 803-04. Federal courts may depart from state law only if the case 
involves an important federal interest requiring uniformity of treatment. See, e.g., Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding that a uniform federal common law 
governs the rights and duties of the United States when the federal government deals in 
commercial paper, and omitting any reference to the possibility of borrowing state law as the 
rule of decision). This Note refers to the construction of federal common law in cases not 
arising under federal statutes as applications of the "Clearfield doctrine." Federal courts, 
however, may be reluctant to apply the Clearfield doctrine when the United States is not a 
party to the lawsuit. See, e.g., Bank of America Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 
29 (1956) (refusing, in a case in which the United States was not a party to the lawsuit, to 
apply the Clearfield doctrine to a transaction nearly identical to the one involved in 
Clearfield). See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal 
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reason why this factor should not operate in a similar fashion when 
a court fills a gap in a federal statute. 
2. Magnitude and Complexity of the Interstitial Lawmaking 
Project 
The Supreme Court has expressed greater willingness to borrow 
state law when doing otherwise would require it to formulate a 
large and intricate body of common law. In Kamen v. Kemper Fi-
nancial Services, Inc., 132 for example, the respondent suggested that 
the Court disregard state corporation law in favor of a federal uni-
versal demand rule in suits under the Investment Company Act of 
1940.133 The Court refused, responding that detaching "the de-
mand standard from the standard for reviewing board action would 
require a quantum of federal common lawmaking that exceeds the 
federal courts' interstitial mandate .... [The respondent's] sugges-
tion would impose upon federal courts [a] duty 'to fashion an entire 
body of federal corporate law' .... "134 
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 410 & n.130 (1964) (describing the dissonance created 
by the combination of Clearfield and Parnell). 
When federal courts decide to borrow state law as the rule of decision, the analysis is 
somewhat different. State law still provides the rule of decision, but it does so only if the 
substance of the rule is not inconsistent with federal policy in the area. See, e.g., Wissner v. 
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (holding that a state community property law granting an es· 
tranged widow half of the proceeds to her husband's army life insurance policy conflicted 
with Congress's policy, as expressed in the statute creating life insurance for army employees, 
of allowing the decedent to designate the beneficiary); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 
317 U.S.173 (1942) (refusing to borrow a state estoppel law because its application would be 
inconsistent with a federal statute). 
Thus, in any setting, state law cannot apply in any sense if its application would frustrate a 
federal policy. The difference is that when state law would otherwise apply of its own force, 
courts are extraordinarily reluctant to find that an overriding federal interest requires invoca-
tion of the Clearfield doctrine to create a uniform federal law. When federal courts borrow 
state law, they feel more freedom to discard that law as against a federal interest. See gener-
ally Mishkin, supra note 1 (arguing that federal courts are free to pick and choose among 
state laws when borrowing state law but not when applying state law that governs of its own 
force). But see Field, supra note 123, at 950-53 (questioning the relevance of this distinction). 
Section III.B of this Note cites diversity cases involving federal common law questions to 
provide additional examples of the principles involved. The reader should always bear in 
mind, however, the differences between applying the Clearfield doctrine and filling gaps in 
federal statutes. 
132. 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
133. 500 U.S. at 103-04 (construing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(a)-65 (1988)). 
134. 500 U.S. at 104-05 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979)); see also 
Burks, 441 U.S. at 480 (noting that borrowing state law in the case at bar "relieve(d] federal 
courts of the necessity to fashion an entire body of federal corporate law out of whole 
cloth"); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351U.S.570, 581 (1956) (drawing upon a "ready-made body 
of state law" to define the word children instead of constructing a uniform common law 
definition); Mishkin, supra note 1, at 826-28 (relying in part on the magnitude and complexity 
of common lawmaking necessary to create a uniform law governing United States commer-
cial paper to argue in favor of the result in Parnell). But see Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (holding that federal courts should construct a necessarily 
complicated body of federal common law to govern collective bargaining agreements). 
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3. Limited Information 
Courts also consider the limited capacity to gather information 
characteristic of the judicial branch in deciding whether to borrow 
state law. In United States v. Brosnan,135 for example, the Court 
borrowed state law to determine the relative priority of federal tax 
liens on a mortgagor's land, stating that it was "ill-equipped to as-
sess" the policy considerations in favor of or against granting fed-
eral tax liens a higher priority than private creditors.136 The Court 
concluded that a "wise resolution of such a far-reaching problem 
[could not] be achieved within the confines of a lawsuit."137 
4. Expectation Interests of Private Parties 
Courts facing a borrowing decision tend to resort to state law if 
disregarding state law would interfere with the reasonable expecta-
tions of private parties that state law would govern their transac-
tions. In Brosnan, a case involving the extinguishment of tax liens, 
the Court held that because "[f]ederal tax liens are wholly creations 
of federal statute,"138 any rule regarding their extinguishment could 
come only from federal law.139 The Court nevertheless borrowed 
state law, fearing that a uniform national rule prioritizing federal 
tax liens above the claims of private creditors would result in "se-
vere dislocation to local property relationships" and in disruption of 
"many titles ... secured" by "[l]ong accepted nonjudicial means of 
enforcing private liens."140 
5. Interference in State Regulation and Regulatory Judgments 
The Supreme Court has indicated that if constructing a uniform 
common law rule would disrupt state regulation of a certain field, 
or would disregard a careful balancing of interests already com-
pleted by state authorities, federal courts should borrow state law. 
135. 363 U.S. 237 (1960). 
136. 363 U.S. at 252. 
137. 363 U.S. at 252. 
138. 363 U.S. at 240. 
139. 363 U.S. at 240. 
140. 363 U.S. at 242; see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 {1991) 
(stating that federal courts should normally incorporate state law "in areas in which private 
parties have entered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights and obligations 
would be governed by state-law standards"); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 
715, 739 {1979) (applying the Clearfield doctrine to hold that priority of United States con-
tractual liens resulting from federal loan programs was a matter governed by federal common 
law, but nevertheless borrowing state law in the area because "[c]reditors who justifiably rely 
on state law to obtain superior liens would have their expectations thwarted whenever a 
federal contractual security interest suddenly appeared and took precedence"); Wilson v. 
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979) (applying the reasoning of Kimbell Foods to a case 
involving the rights of Native Americans to land abutting a river). 
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Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, lnc.141 involved the question 
of whether shareholders must make a demand upon a corporation's 
board of directors before suing under the Investment Company Act 
of 1940.142 The Court borrowed state law,143 reasoning that the de-
mand requirement was a crucial component of a state's judgment 
regarding the respective roles of corporate directors and sharehold-
ers, and thus that " [ s ]uperimposing a rule of universal-demand over 
the corporate doctrine of [the] States would clearly upset the bal-
ance that they have struck between the power of the individual 
shareholder and the power of the directors to control corporate 
litigation. "144 
6. Better Match from Federal Law 
The Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts may bor-
row a rule from a federal statute if that statute resulted from a con-
gressional balance of the same values at issue in the instant case. In 
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 145 for ex-
ample, the Court confronted a lawsuit based on an implied right of 
action for violation of section lO{b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.146 The Court held that "where ... the claim asserted is one 
implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of action 
with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the statute 
of origin to ascertain the proper limitations periods. "147 Presuma-
bly, the limitation periods already specified in the statute of origin 
provided a congressional judgment concerning the balance of re-
pose, trial accuracy, and a plaintiff's right to recover under circum-
stances similar to those at issue in Lampf.14s 
141. 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
142. 500 U.S. at 92 (construing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(a)-65 (1988)). 
143. The Court followed the rationale of its holding in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 
(1979). 
144. 500 U.S. at 103; see also United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 252 (1960) (adopting 
state law to prevent "dislocation of long-standing state procedures" governing liens); Recon-
struction Fin. Corp. v. Beavef County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (borrowing state law to de-
fine a term in a statute making federal land subject to state taxes in part because permitting 
"the States to tax, and yet [requiring] them to alter their long-standing practice of assess-
ments and collections, would create the kind of confusion and resultant hampering of local 
tax machinery which we are certain Congress did not intend"); Board of Commrs. v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939) (choosing to follow state law governing interest on a judg-
ment against a state stemming from the state's improper collection of property taxes, in part 
out of deference to the "local institutions and local interests" represented by the state law of 
real property). 
145. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). 
146. 501 U.S. at 352 (construing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)). 
147. 501 U.S. at 359. 
148. 501 U.S. at 359 (discussing "the policy considerations implicated in any limitations 
provision"); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (stating that 
federal courts should refuse to borrow state law when "express provisions in analogous statu-
tory schemes embody congressional policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand"); 
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7. Judicial Legislation 
The Supreme Court has stated that courts should borrow state 
law if construction of federal common law would require courts to 
engage in tasks traditionally considered legislative. The strongest 
indication of this factor's force is the long line of cases borrowing 
state statutes of limitations to apply to federal causes of action lack-
ing limitation periods.149 In general, courts consider making up a 
limitation period a "drastic sort· of judicial legislation,"150 and fed-
eral courts without exception refuse to engage in "so bald a form of 
judicial innovation."151 
8. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction 
When a statute grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal judici-
ary, federal courts should consider this grant a factor in favor of 
ignoring state law.152 Exclusive jurisdiction is strong evidence of a 
congressional intent to make the actors regulated by the statute 
subject to a uniform body of federal law. The uniformity provided 
by exclusive jurisdiction applies to both substantive and procedural 
legal rules; state courts cannot apply their own procedures to cases 
they cannot hear.153 Furthermore, as Professor Mishkin has sug-
gested, if federal courts borrow state law in exclusive jurisdiction 
cases, state law "must of necessity be applied without any possibil-
ity of state court consideration of the precise type of case. The use 
of local rules under these circumstances is thus necessarily attended 
by speculation as to the weight which state courts might attribute to 
various factors in the federal situation."154 For both of these rea-
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (applying a limitation 
period contained in § lO(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988), 
to an employee's suit against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation under § 301 
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988)). 
For an example of an argument that state law can provide a better analogy in certain 
instances, see supra note 47 (discussing Justice Scalia's view that a state statute of limitations' 
more general coverage makes borrowing state law more appropriate in the statute of limita-
tions context). 
149. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text. 
150. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966). 
151. 383 U.S. at 701; see also Field, supra note 123, at 960-61 (describing the judiciary's 
sense that making up limitation periods is not something judges do); Mishkin, supra note 1, at 
803-04 & n.27 (noting that federal courts sometimes choose state law "because of special 
difficulty in the judicial framing of a definite federal rule on a special issue in an area other-
wise totally national"). 
152. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (construing a statu-
tory grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction to imply a congressional intent that federal courts 
construct federal common law). 
153. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the substantive 
versus procedural division in causes of action over which state courts exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction). 
154. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 819. Mishkin discusses the importance of exclusive juris-
diction using the example of Dyke v. Dyke, 227 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1955). Mishkin, supra note 
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sons, a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts suggests 
that courts should ignore state law. 
9. Distrust of the States 
In some areas, Congress passes statutes specifically to restrict 
the zone of state influence or to deter state behavior. When filling 
gaps in such statutes, the Supreme Court has in some cases cited 
this congressional purpose as a reason not to borrow state law, and 
in other cases omitted consideration of the borrowing option alto-
gether. For example, in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, 155 the Court refused to borrow state law to define a term 
used in a federal statute in part because "Congress perceived the 
States and their courts as partly responsible for the problem it in-
tended to correct. "156 
10. Choice of State Difficulties 
The nature of some controversies makes it virtually impossible 
to choose a particular state's law as the proper source for borrow-
ing, suggesting a need for uniform federal rules. Justice Brennan's 
concurring opinion in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 157 for 
example, articulates this rationale in an admiralty case in which the 
Court refused to borrow state statutes of limitations: "In actions 
arising at sea, frequently beyond the territorial bounds of any state, 
1, at 816-20. Dyke involved the question of competence to change the beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy granted under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940. 227 F.2d at 
464 (construing 38 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1929). According to Mishkin, a uniform national rule of 
competency was appropriate because "litigation of [the competency] question is exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Mishkin, supra note 1, at 819. Mishkin thus 
concluded that exclusive jurisdiction "tends to suggest a congressional determination for im· 
plementation of [the statutory scheme] without regard to local patterns." Id. at 819. 
155. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
156. 490 U.S. at 45. The Court rarely articulates explicitly its distrust of the states as a 
reason to refuse altogether to consider borrowing state law. Nevertheless, distrust could be 
at work in cases like Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 
{1976), and Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). In these cases, all three arising under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), the Court did not even mention the possibility of borrowing state law. 
These holdings are striking in light of Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), a § 1983 
case in which the Court considered itself bound to apply state law by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). 
See 436 U.S. at 588-90; see also supra note 92. 
One way to reconcile these cases is to point out that Pierson, Imbler, and Carey all in-
volved rules affecting the liability of states or state officers that the state might manipulate to 
minimize its § 1983 liability. Pierson and Imbler both involved the scope of immunity of state 
officials from§ 1983 liability. 386 U.S. at 548-52; 424 U.S. at 410-17. Carey involved whether 
students suspended from school without procedural due process may recover presumed dam-
ages. 435 U.S. at 248. Robertson, in contrast, involved a question of the survival of an action 
after a plaintiff's death, 436 U.S. at 585, a rule that states are less likely to be able to manipu-
late to avoid§ 1983. But see Board of Commrs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-53 (1939) 
(borrowing a state law providing that private litigants could not collect interest on recovery 
of taxes wrongfully collected by a state body). 
157. 357 U.S. 221, 227 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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normal choice-of-law doctrines are likely to prove inadequate to 
the task of supplying certainty and predictability."15s 
11. Forum Shopping 
The Supreme Court has expressed greater willingness to con-
struct a uniform national rule if borrowing state law will present a 
danger of forum shopping.159 The force of this factor is somewhat 
limited in suits involving local transactions, where the plaintiff may 
have few forum choices. But in cases involving large, interstate 
transactions, where the defendant may be amenable to suit in sev-
eral jurisdictions, forum shopping can be a substantial danger.16° 
12. The Possibility of Uniformity 
If a statute uses terms or structures regulatory rules in a way 
that prevents uniformity regardless of the rule adopted in a particu-
lar case, courts perceive a message from Congress that uniform na-
tional rules in the area are unnecessary. In Reconstruction Finance 
Corp. v. Beaver County,161 the Court considered the meaning of the 
term real property as used in a statute making certain federal land 
subject to state taxes.162 The Court, recognizing that tax laws gov-
erning realty differ from state to state, refused to exercise its power 
to provide a uniform definition "as a matter of federal law" in part 
because "Congress, in permitting local taxation of the real property, 
158. 357 U.S. at 230; see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 
U.S. 143, 148-54 (1987) (discussing the difficulty of choosing a particular state's law in civil 
RICO actions); cf. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451U.S.630 (1981) (omitting 
consideration of the option of absorbing state law to provide rules of contribution for joint 
antitrust tortfeasors, perhaps in part because of the difficulty of pinpointing what state's law 
to borrow in antitrust cases). Courts could solve this problem simply by borrowing at all 
times the law of the state in which the suit was filed, but such a policy would create forum-
shopping problems, itself another factor. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. 
This Note uses the term "choice of state" instead of the more traditional "choice of law" 
because commentators often use the latter term to refer to choices both between federal and 
state law and between the law of two different states. 
159. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 357 
(1991) (applying this rationale to private claims under§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 
U.S. 30, 45-46 (1989) (articulating the danger of forum shopping in the field of interstate 
child custody law); Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 153-54 (applying this rationale to claims 
under the civil enforcement provision of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988)); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 230 
(1958) (Brennan, J., concurring) (supporting the Court's decision to ignore state statutes of 
limitations in an admiralty case, in part because "[t]he mischief to be avoided is the possibil-
ity of shopping for the forum with the most favorable period of limitations"). 
160. See, e.g., Lampf, 501 U.S. at 537 (applying this rationale); Agency Holding, 483 U.S. 
at 153-54 (same). 
161. 328 U.S. 204 (1946). 
162. 328 U.S. at 208-09 (construing the Reconstruction Fmance Corporation Act, ch. 8, 
§ 10, 47 Stat. 5, 9-10 (1932), amended by Act of June 10, 1941, ch. 190, § 3, 55 Stat. 248, 248). 
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made it impossible to apply the law with uniform tax consequences 
in each State and locality."163 
C. Application of Factors 
This section applies the factors identified in section IIl.B to the 
question of the validity of plan limitation periods. It concludes that 
courts should adopt a uniform national rule upholding plan limita-
tion periods. 
The application of the factors identified above to the issue dis-
cussed in this Note depends heavily on the content of a federal 
common law rule. One cannot decide whether to adopt a uniform 
federal rule to determine the validity of plan limitation periods 
without also deciding what the content of that rule would be. To 
apply these factors, this section analyzes the plan limitation periods 
question in terms of three possibilities available to federal courts. 
First, courts could borrow state law to decide the validity of plan 
limitation periods. Second, courts could formulate a uniform na-
tional rule invalidating such periods. Third, courts could formulate 
a uniform national rule upholding such periods. Although the de-
sirability of a federal common law rule is in theory a distinct ques-
tion from the content of that rule, examination of these three 
possibilities shows why the two inquiries cannot be separated. Each 
possible rule requires a different analysis in terms of the factors 
identified in section III.B. 
Constructing federal common law often requires a holistic look 
at an area of law and a willingness to decide theoretically distinct 
questions together. Courts essentially act as policymakers to 
achieve a congressionally desired or an otherwise best result. This 
exercise may require experimenting with different combinations of 
rules on theoretically distinct questions to see if the overall result is 
desirable.164 Such is the case regarding plan limitation periods. 
163. 328 U.S. at 208-09; see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) 
(adopting state law to define the word children because the statute at issue used words like 
"widow," "widower," "next of kin," "executor," and "adopted," which the Court held had to 
be defined by state law, thus making uniformity impossible); Mishkin, supra note 1, at 820-22 
& n.98 (citing De Sylva as an example of a case in which uniformity of application was 
impossible). 
Recall that the factors discussed in this section are all to some extent reversible. See 
supra note 124. The opposite of the factor focusing on the impossibility of uniformity is, of 
course, the principle that courts should be more willing to construct a uniform national rule if 
real uniformity can be achieved in the specific area of law at issue. This latter principle is 
important in the ERISA plan limitation period context. See infra section III.C.2. 
164. Mishkin uses a similar type of analysis in one of his case studies in his article on 
federal common law. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 828-33. He examines the holding of 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), that a lawsuit based upon United 
States commercial paper and including the United States as a party is governed by uniform 
federal common law rules. Mishkin argues that the desirability of a uniform federal common 
law rule for cases involving U.S. checks in which the United States is a party depends largely 
upon the desirability of uniform rules for similar suits in which the United States is not a 
November 1994] Note - ERISA Plan Limitation Periods 417 
Section III.C.1 distinguishes those factors that are helpful in the 
plan limitation period context from those that are inapplicable to 
this question. Section III.C.2 illustrates how these factors operate 
in the three different situations identified above: if courts borrow 
state law, if courts formulate a uniform national rule invalidating 
plan limitation periods, and if courts formulate a uniform rule up-
holding such periods. This section concludes that the latter is the 
superior choice. 
1. Distinguishing Applicable and Inapplicable Factors 
Not all of the factors identified in section III.B are instructive 
for each federal common law case. This section argues that the 
three instructive factors in the area of plan limitation periods are 
the danger of forum shopping, choice of state difficulties, and the 
possibility of uniformity. 
In general, the application of these factors focuses on whether 
the "scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide 
legal standards"165 or whether a state's rules "serve[] legitimate 
and important state interests the fulfillment of which Congress 
might have contemplated through application of state law."166 As 
Professor Mishkin has noted, courts deciding whether to borrow 
state law must often balance the gain of uniformity against "the po-
tential losses from non-integration of the national program with 
normal state activities."167 This formulation captures much of what 
is at stake in the choice between state and federal law, and courts 
are generally aware of it when making the choice.16s 
The factor of traditional state governance in an area of law does 
not cut for or against borrowing state law in the plan limitation pe-
riod context. Before 1974, pension plans were indeed regulated by 
state contract and insurance laws. But Congress passed BRISA in 
large part because regulation by state law was producing unsatisfac-
tory results - primarily the cancellation or underfunding of pen-
sion plans which employees were relying upon for post-retirement 
income.169 Thus, although state law traditionally dominated the 
party. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 828-33. Because the Court decided - correctly, in 
Mishkin's view - in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 
(1956), that suits between private parties would be governed by state law, a different rule 
based merely on the presence of the United States as a party made little sense. Mishkin, 
supra note 1, at 828-33; see also Friendly, supra note 131, at 409-11 & 410 n.130. 
165. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991). 
166. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 599 (1973). 
167. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 812. 
168. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947) (noting the 
absence of a strong state interest in a case applying the Clearfield doctrine to preempt state 
law). 
169. See 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(a) (1988). 
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employee benefits area before 1974, Congress passed BRISA to 
end this tradition. Accordingly, there is no continuing tradition of 
state dominance to support borrowing state law in the context of 
plan limitation periods. 
The next two factors, the magnitude and complexity of the inter-
stitial lawmaking project and the limited information capacities of 
the judiciary, also weigh neither for nor against borrowing state law. 
Deciding the validity of plan limitation periods without reference to 
state law would not require that courts construct a large, complex 
body of federal common law. At most, courts would have to decide 
whether to uphold plan limitation periods and, if so, whether a par-
ticular plan period is reasonable. Furthermore, such an inquiry 
does not require judges to gain command over a complex body of 
information. The effects of a uniform national rule either uphold-
ing or invalidating plan limitation periods are easily articulated11o 
based on information within the grasp of the judiciary. Because the 
difficulties of complexity and information gathering are not present, 
courts need not consider these factors in the plan limitation period 
context. 
The next two factors, the expectation interests of private parties 
and interference with state regulatory judgments, are inapplicable 
to the plan limitation period question because of the broad preemp-
tion of BRISA section 514(a). Plan beneficiaries, administrators, 
and contributors cannot reasonably rely upon state law to provide 
the rule of decision in a dispute concerning pension and welfare 
benefits in the face of section 514(a)'s preemption of all state laws 
that "relate to"171 benefits plans. Similarly, Congress preempted al-
most all state regulatory judgments regarding pension and welfare 
plans when passing BRISA. To the extent that the concerns under-
lying these factors have motivated courts to borrow state law, these 
factors should not affect the plan limitation period question. 
The next factor, the presence of a better match from federal law, 
is also unhelpful in the plan limitation period context. No analo-
gous federal statute provides useful guidance, and the purpose be-
hind section 514(a) may not be specific enough to direct courts to 
apply federal law.172 While previously existing common law in the 
federal courts did allow the parties to a contract to include a provi-
sion shortening a limitation period,173 none of these cases examined 
the question in a setting more closely analogous to the BRISA sec-
tion 502(a)(l)(B) area than did similar state cases. Accordingly, 
170. See infra notes 177-97 and accompanying text. 
171. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
172. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text. 
173. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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these cases do not provide a match superior to state law regarding 
contractual limitation periods. 
The same federal cases articulating a federal common law rule 
upholding contractual limitation periods also suggest that judges 
would not be engaging in illegitimate judicial legislation if they 
were to formulate a uniform national rule upholding or denying 
plan limitation periods. If federal courts are competent to articu-
late a rule upholding or invalidating contractual limitation periods, 
there is little reason to think that federal courts would be less com-
petent to construct a similar rule in the section 502(a)(l)(B) 
context. 
The next two factors, exclusive federal jurisdiction and distrust 
of states, are also unhelpful in deciding whether to borrow state law 
to decide the validity of plan limitation periods. Plaintiffs may 
bring section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits in either state or federal 
court,174 and states are highly unlikely to manipulate their general 
laws regarding contractual modification in order to achieve a cer-
tain result in the section 502(a)(l)(B) context. 
The remaining factors, however, do provide significant guidance 
regarding the choice between state and federal law in the plan limi-
tation period context. These factors are forum shopping, choice of 
state difficulties, and the possibility of uniformity. Although the 
danger of forum shopping exists whenever a court chooses to bor-
row state law, the danger is less acute when potential defendants 
are susceptible to in personam jurisdiction in a limited number of 
states.175 BRISA plans, however, may be large, interstate entities 
involved in a variety of transactions,176 thus making the danger of 
forum shopping more acute. If plaintiffs do forum shop, courts will 
face difficult choice of state questions; the forum district court will 
have to decide whether to borrow the law of the state in which it 
sits or to absorb the law of some other state. Finally, the third re-
maining factor, uniformity, also affects the choice of whether to 
borrow state law. Courts might be able to avoid forum-shopping 
and choice of state difficulties by adopting a uniform federal rule; 
the effect of this factor, however, depends largely on whether the 
rule upholds or invalidates plan limitation periods. 
In conclusion, then, while ten of the factors identified in section 
III.B provide little guidance as to whether a federal court should 
borrow state law to decide the validity of plan limitation periods, 
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (1988). 
175. The Supreme Court has liberalized the rules of in personam jurisdiction in the last 
half century. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610 n.1 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
176. Cf. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (finding preemption under 
ERISA § 514(a) in part because of the problems inherent in administering "nationwide" 
plans); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987). 
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three factors are applicable. The next section examines which way 
these factors cut. 
2. Whether to Ignore State Law, and the Content of a Uniform 
Common Law Rule 
Federal courts facing a plan limitation period have three 
choices: borrowing state law to decide the validity of plan limita-
tion periods, formulating a uniform national rule invalidating plan 
periods, or formulating a uniform rule upholding such plan provi-
sions. This section concludes that the last choice, a federal common 
law rule upholding plan limitation periods, constitutes the best pos-
sible world in terms of the three factors identified above. 
a. Borrowing State Law. Application of the three relevant fac-
tors indicates that federal courts should not borrow state law to de-
cide the validity of plan limitation periods. As noted above, some 
BRISA plans are amenable to in personam jurisdiction in a variety 
of states.177 If courts borrow state law to decide the validity of plan 
limitation periods, section 502(a)(l)(B) plaintiffs may forum shop 
by filing their lawsuits in states like Florida178 and Texas,179 states 
whose statutes prohibit or limit contractual modifications of the 
statute of limitations.180 
Such forum shopping will cause difficult choice of state 
problems. When a section 502(a)(l)(B) plaintiff files in an odd fo-
rum to take advantage of laws invalidating plan limitation periods, 
federal district courts choosing to borrow state law face three un-
happy options. First, district courts can apply the law of the states 
in which they sit, thus rewarding the plaintiff's forum shopping. 
Second, they can engage in a choice of law analysis to decide what 
state's rules to follow, an option requiring examination of a ques-
tion the Supreme Court has striven to avoid: does the holding of 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 181 require re-
course to state choice of law rules in "arising under" jurisdiction, or 
should courts use federal choice of law rules?182 Third, courts can 
177. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
178. See FLA. STAT. ch. 95.03 (1993) (voiding any provision that shortens the time period 
to less than the applicable statute of limitations). 
179. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CooE ANN. § 2.725(a) (West 1994) (limiting modifications to 
not less than one year and not more than four years). 
180. For a list of some of the states with statutes invalidating contractual limitation peri· 
ods, see supra note 29. Note that§ 502(a)(l)(B) plaintiffs will make this choice even if the 
relevant employment contract was executed in another state. 
181. 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that in diversity cases district courts should use the 
choice of law principles of the state in which the court sits). 
182. See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.8 (1966) (avoiding this 
issue); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351U.S.570, 581 (1956) (avoiding the issue because the choice 
in the case was "not difficult"); McKenzie v. Irving 'lhlst Co., 323 U.S. 365, 371 n.2 (1945) 
(avoiding this issue); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942) (same). 
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transfer the case to a district court having greater contacts to the 
parties and the litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),183 thus raising 
the even more complicated issue of whether Van Dusen v. Bar-
rack184 and Ferens v. John Deere Co.185 affect the transferee court's 
choice of state law. BRISA plan administrators have anticipated 
some of these problems and attempted to solve them by inserting 
choice of law clauses into their plans, but the circuits are split on 
whether these choice of law clauses are themselves enforceable.186 
Justice White has described the kind of problems already facing 
courts in BRISA cases: 
The increasing significance of ERISA litigation is apparent from the 
growing number of such cases that appear on our docket . . . . More-
over, because the coverage of particular ERISA plans frequently ex-
tends to beneficiaries in more than one State - and, no doubt, in 
more than one judicial circuit - differences in the rules governing 
access to federal court for the purpose of pressing a claim under 
ERISA may have the troubling effect of encouraging forum shopping 
by plaintiffs.187 
Borrowing state law regarding plan limitation periods will only 
compound these problems. 
In addition to forum-shopping and choice of state problems, the 
factor of uniformity also does not favor borrowing state law. Uni-
formity is obviously not achieved if courts borrow state law to de-
cide the validity of plan limitation periods. Barring some effort to 
produce a uniform code of state law governing contractual limita-
tion periods, these problems are inherent in the choice to borrow 
state law in this field. Borrowing state law is thus an unsatisfactory 
choice. 
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). 
184. 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (holding that after a transfer of a diversity case under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a) (1988), when the transfer was the result of a motion by the defendant, federal 
district courts should use the choice of law rules of the state in which the transferor court 
sits). 
185. 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (holding that the rule of Van Dusen applies even when the plain-
tiff requests the § 1404(a) transfer). 
186. Compare Wang Labs., Inc. v. Kagan, 990 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1993) (borrowing 
the statute of limitations of the state chosen in the plan's choice of law clause, as opposed to 
the statute of limitations of the state in which district court sat) with Central States, S.E. & 
S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, 799 F.2d 1098, 1105 & n5 (6th Cir. 1986) (ignoring a 
plan's choice of law clause and borrowing the statute of limitations from the state in which 
the district court sat). 
Note that these arguments are applicable whenever a court confronts gaps in a federal 
statute governing large, multistate transactions. In fact, the Supreme Court has stated explic-
itly that such transactions often require uniform federal rules to prevent many of the 
problems discussed in the text. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 
501 U.S. 350, 357 (1991) (applying this principle to support borrowing a federal limitation 
period in order to avoid "complex and expensive litigation over what should be a straightfor-
ward matter" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
187. Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 474 U.S. 1087 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
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b. Constructing a Uniform National Rule Invalidating Plan Peri-
ods. The relevant factors also indicate that courts should not con-
struct a federal common law rule invalidating plan limitation 
periods. A uniform rule would initially appear to eliminate forum-
shopping and choice of state difficulties, but courts must then de-
cide what limitation period governs the section 502(a)(1)(B) cause 
of action. Courts would in all probability answer this question by 
borrowing the state statute of limitations for suits on written con-
tracts.188 But this practice does not solve the forum-shopping prob-
lem, because state limitation periods for suits on a written contract 
vary widely.189 Plaintiffs would likely forum shop for a lengthy stat-
ute of limitations, again to avoid a limitation bar to their lawsuits. 
Such forum shopping leads to the same choice of state problems as 
would exist if courts were to borrow state law to decide the validity 
of plan limitation periods in the first place. Thus, applying a uni-
form rule invalidating plan limitation periods represents no im-
provement over borrowing state law to decide the validity of plan 
limitation periods. Neither approach provides any significant gain 
in uniformity, or in solving forum-shopping and choice of state 
difficulties.190 
c. Constructing a Uniform National Rule Upholding Plan Limi-
tation Periods. A uniform national rule upholding plan limitation 
periods results in a significant gain in uniformity and a correspond-
ing decrease in the possibility of litigation collateral to the merits of 
a section 502(a)(1)(B) lawsuit. If federal courts enforce limitation 
periods, they would have no need to look to state law to find either 
a statute of limitations191 or a rule governing the validity of contrac-
tual limitation periods. The plan itself would clearly state the limi-
tation period regardless of the law of any state. 
Examining these issues from the point of view of a plan adminis-
trator also indicates that uniformity is best served by a rule uphold-
ing reasonable limitation periods. In passing BRISA, Congress 
sought to ensure smooth and rapid administration of benefits plans. 
Thus, for example, various BRISA provisions require fiduciaries 
administering plans to consider administrative integrity in making 
188. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
190. There is one reason why a uniform national rule invalidating plan limitation periods 
might still be slightly superior to resorting to state law. State statutes of limitations for suits 
on written contracts will normally be longer than plan limitation periods. If courts invalidate 
plan limitation periods and consult only the state statutes, the limitation issue is less likely to 
arise, because longer limitation periods mean that a plaintiff is more likely to have filed 
before the period expired. 
191. See, e.g., Central States, S.E. & S.W. Pension Fund v. King Dodge, Inc., 835 F.2d 
1238 (8th Cir. 1987) (following a state court's pronouncements on the applicability of the 
state's two limitation periods governing suits on written contracts). 
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decisions.192 BRISA section 503193 requires each plan to have an 
internal appeals process to help avoid unnecessary litigation over 
denial of benefits. Smooth administration helps minimize the per-
centage of plan income directed to purposes other than providing 
employee benefits. 
Plan limitation periods aid in smooth administration. As al-
ready n<;>ted above, in the absence of plan periods, federal courts 
would likely borrow state limitation periods for suits on written 
contracts. These limitation periods can be quite long, some as many 
as ten or fifteen years.194 State legislatures setting these lengthy 
periods probably did not contemplate their application to a quasi-
contractual arrangement like an BRISA plan, an arrangement that 
by statute must include an internal appeals process to resolve some 
disputes and upon which large numbers of employees depend. Af-
ter initially ruling on an employee's application for benefits, and 
after reviewing a denial through the appeals process required by 
section 503, 195 plan administrators will desire to close the books on 
a particular claim. Rapid and final disposition of a claim, with a 
shortened but reasonable time period for filing suit, will allow plans 
to order their future investments and arrangements free from the 
worry of lawsuits based on events that took place up to fifteen years 
ago. Smooth administration ultimately will benefit the rest of the 
employees covered by the plan by minimizing the quantity of plan 
funds devoted to functions other than paying benefits, a goal con-
gruent with Congress's purpose in passing BRISA. 
Indeed, in cases deciding the scope of the preemption under 
BRISA section 514, the Supreme Court has recognized that varia-
tions in state law may cause inefficiencies in plan administration, 
and has stated that this result should be avoided when possible.196 
Although borrowing state law to decide the validity of plan limita-
tion periods might not create the "patchwork scheme of regulation" 
nor the "considerable inefficiencies in benefit program opera-
tion"197 that concerned the Court in the preemption cases, the prac-
192. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a){l){A) (1988) (requiring that plan fiduciaries administer 
the plan "for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their benefi-
ciaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan"). 
193. 29 u.s.c. § 1133 (1988). 
194. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
195. Plan beneficiaries are required to exhaust this internal appeals process before filing 
suit. Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 1087 {1986); see also Jared A. Goldstein, Note, Employment Discrimination Claims 
Under ERISA Section 510: Should Courts Require Exhaustion of Arbitral and Plan Reme-
dies?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 193, 196 n.23, 199-200 n.39 {1994) (collecting cases on ERISA 
exhaustion). 
196. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 {1990); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. 
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987). 
197. 482 U.S. at 11. 
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tice of borrowing the entire body of state limitation law might. The 
mere fact that plans have chosen to insert plan limitation periods in 
their regulations suggests that plans are attempting to avoid even 
the relatively minor administrative difficulties associated with varia-
tions in state statutes of limitations. A uniform rule upholding plan 
limitation periods would thereby improve plan administration. 
In conclusion, the possibility of uniformity, forum shopping, and 
choice of state considerations support the adoption of a uniform 
national rule regarding the validity of plan limitation periods, but 
only if that rule upholds these periods. 
IV. CONSISTENCY WITH BRISA POLICY OF A NATIONAL RULE 
UPHOLDING PLAN LIMITATION PERIODS 
· The Supreme Court has emphasized that "[i]f there is a federal 
statute dealing with the general subject, it is a prime repository of 
federal policy and a starting point for federal common law."198 This 
principle suggests that any rule governing the validity of plan limita-
tion periods must be consistent with BRISA's general purpose and 
policies. Accordingly, this section takes a final look at the consis-
tency between a rule enforcing plan limitation periods and general 
federal policy in the area of employee benefits. Section IV.A ar-
gues that a canon of statutory interpretation in favor of common 
law rules suggests that the importation into the BRISA section 
502(a)(l)(B) context of the previously existing common law rule 
upholding contractual limitation periods would not be inconsistent 
with the purposes of BRISA. Section IV.B rebuts the argument 
that plan limitation periods should be declared invalid because they 
will invariably cause some meritorious claims to fail on limitation 
grounds. This section concludes that the rule suggested is not in-
consistent with BRISA policy even if some meritorious claims will 
be time-barred. 
A. The Canon in Favor of Common Law Rules 
When a federal statute is silent on an issue addressed by an en-
trenched common law principle, courts presume that Congress in-
tended for the common law rule to apply in the context of the 
statute, unless Congress has manifested a contrary intent.199 As a 
unanimous Supreme Court stated recently in Astoria Federal Sav-
198. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966). 
199. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). The issue of the validity of 
plan limitation periods occupies an uncertain place near the line dividing statutory interpre-
tation from common lawmaking, assuming that such a line even exists. See supra note 110. 
Accordingly, applying a canon of statutory construction to this issue is proper. 
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ings & Loan Assn. v. Solimino,200 the ultimate question is always 
what the legislature intended, but 
[t]he presumption holds nonetheless, for Congress is understood to 
legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory princi-
ples. Thus, where a common-law principle is well established ... the 
courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expec-
tation that the principle will apply except "when a statutory purpose 
to the contrary is evident."201 
United States common law includes an entrenched rule that 
contractual modifications of the limitation periods applicable to a 
suit on a written contract are valid so long as no statute prohibits. 
such modifications and so long as the contractual period allows a 
reasonable time for a lawsuit. The Supreme Court202 and the vast 
majority of states203 have followed this rule. The Supreme Court 
discussed the first part of this rule in Riddlesbarger v. Hartford In-
surance Co., 204 an early case involving a lawsuit by an insured on his 
policy.2os The Court explained that the parties to a contract may 
specify the conditions upon which performance depends, and that a 
contractual limitation period is an example of such a condition.206 
Later courts concluded that so long as a contractual limitation pe-
riod is reasonable, courts should enforce the parties' voluntarily 
agreed-upon terms.201 
This common law background suggests that a rule upholding 
plan limitation periods would not be inconsistent with how Con-
gress believed that federal courts would fill gaps in BRISA. Fed-
200. 501 U.S. 104 (1991). 
201. 501 U.S. at 108 (citations omitted) (quoting lsbrandtsen, 343 U.S. at 783); see also 
Midlantic Natl. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) 
("The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to 
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."). 
This rule is akin to the principle that when Congress uses a legal term of art in a statute 
without usefully defining that term, courts presume that Congress intends for the common 
law definition to apply. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992); 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990). 
202. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 
(1947) (modification must be reasonable); see also Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 
287, 297-98 (1890) (parties may agree to a different time period); Riddlesbarger v. Hartford 
Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1868) (same). 
203. See, e.g., C & H Foods, Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 211 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769 (Ct. App. 
1984); Pick v. Associated Indem. Corp., 547 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Brunner v. 
Economy Preferred Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Thomas v. United 
Fire & Cas. Co., 426 N.W.2d 396, 397-98 (Iowa 1988); O'Reilly v. Allstate Ins. Co., 474 
N.W.2d 221, 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel Udall v.'Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 
777, 779 (N.M. 1991); Lane v. Grange Mut. Cos., 543 N.E.2d 488, 489 (Ohio 1989). 
Federal courts may refer to the general body of state common law as developed across the 
nation for guidance in interpreting ERISA. Darden, 112 S. Ct. at 1348 & n.3. 
204. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1868). 
205. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.} at 386-88. 
206. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 390. 
207. See supra notes 202-03. 
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eral courts recognize that an BRISA benefits plan in some ways 
resembles a contract.208 Lower court decisions characterizing the 
essence of an BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B) action as a breach of 
contract suit support this recognition.209 Accordingly, the rule of 
Riddlesbarger upholding contractual limitation periods, along with 
the principle of statutory interpretation favoring common law rules, 
establishes a presumption that a rule upholding plan limitation peri-
ods would not be inconsistent with Congress's expectations regard-
ing federal court gap-filling in the BRISA context.210 
208. See, e.g., Trustees of the Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Os-
wood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 620 {10th Cir. 1988). 
209. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
210. A recent Supreme Court decision provides some additional support for the applica-
tion of the presumption in Astoria to ERISA. See Firestone Trre & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 
U.S. 101, 110-15 {1989) (relying heavily on the common law of trusts to choose a standard of 
review for§ 502{a){1){B) actions without referring to the law of any particular state). 
One can state the Astoria argument articulated in the text in different but closely related 
terms, and in doing so draw additional support from another Supreme Court case. In West v. 
Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 {1987), the Court ruled that because the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provided rules governing when an action is commenced for limitation purposes, federal 
courts should not borrow state commencement rules as part and parcel of a borrowed state 
statute of limitations. 481 U.S. at 38-40. The Court reasoned that "because of the availabil-
ity of Rule 3, there is no lacuna" in federal law necessitating recourse to state law. 481 U.S. 
at 40. One can arguably state the entire presumption in favor of common law rules in similar 
terms: if a clearly established and entrenched common law rule provides an answer to the 
question at issue in a particular case, such as the common law rule validating contractual 
limitation periods, then there is no "lacuna" in federal law necessitating recourse to state law. 
The Supreme Court discussed the strength of the presumption in favor of common law 
rules in Astoria. The Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988) [hereinafter the ADEA], made the common law doctrine of adminis-
trative estoppel inapplicable to age discrimination plaintiffs in some circumstances. Astoria 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501U.S.104, 110-13 (1991). Justice Souter, writing for a 
unanimous court, stated, 
This interpretative presumption is not, however, one that entails a requirement of clear 
statement, to the effect that Congress must state precisely any intention to overcome the 
presumption's application to a given statutory scheme. Rules of plain statement and 
strict construction prevail only to the protection of weighty and constant values •••• 
501 U.S. at 108. 
The Court first found that administrative preclusion does not implicate weighty and con-
stant values. 501 U.S. at 108. Justice Souter gave two examples of weighty and constant 
values that could be reversed only by a plain statement from Congress. The first was state 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 501 U.S. at 108. The second was the presump-
tion against avoiding giving congressional statutes extraterritorial effect. 501 U.S. at 108-09. 
The Court then held that the structure and language of the ADEA illustrated that Con-
gress had assumed, and thus intended, that the doctrine of administrative estoppel would not 
apply in the context of the statute. 501 U.S. at _110-11. Astoria thus illustrates that the exist-
ence of an established common law rule gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that Congress 
intended for the rule to apply in the context of a particular statute. Furthermore, Congress 
need not make a plain statement of its intent in order to overcome this presumption. 
Astoria does not explain exactly what is required to overcome the presumption in favor of 
a common law rule. Justice Souter relied on statutory language and legislative history to find 
that Congress did not intend for administrative estoppel to apply to ADEA suits. 501 U.S. at 
109-14. Astoria does not say, however, whether a court may find that Congress intended to 
reverse an established common law rule when the application of that rule would be inconsis-
tent with a court's view of the purpose of a congressional statute, if the statute's language, 
legislative history, and structure are essentially silent on the issue. Fortunately, federal courts 
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B. Consistency with Federal Policy 
As noted above, any federal common law rule must be consis-
tent with federal policy in the area.211 In the present context, this 
principle requires that the uniform national rule upholding plan 
limitation periods be consistent with BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B)'s 
policy of assuring that employees receive the benefits to which they 
are entitled.212 In essence, the rule regarding plan periods must 
preserve the effectiveness of the section 502(a)(l)(B) cause of ac-
tion. This principle in turn leads to two related concerns. First, a 
federal court could not uphold an extremely short plan limitation 
period - two days, for instance - without raising serious ques-
tions about the consistency of the period with BRISA policy. Sec-
ond, enforcing any plan limitation period raises the strong 
possibility that some meritorious section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits will 
be time-barred. 
The short answer to the second of these arguments is that a uni-
form federal common law rule, like a borrowed state statute, "can-
not be considered 'inconsistent' with federal law merely because 
the [rule] causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. "213 Enforcing 
any limitation period means that some meritorious claims will be 
time-barred. Plaintiffs may still enforce their claims by commenc-
ing their actions within the plan's specified time period.214 Thus, 
plan limitation periods are not inconsistent with BRISA policy on 
this ground alone. 
need not resolve this difficult question to rule on the validity of plan modifications of the 
limitation period applicable to an BRISA § 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit. As section IV.B demon-
strates, a rule upholding plan limitation periods is not inconsistent with the purposes of 
BRISA even if such a rule would cause some meritorious§ 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits to fail. 
Although the canon of statutory interpretation in favor of common law rules appears to 
favor a federal common law rule upholding plan limitation periods, strong reliance on such 
canons would be unwarranted. The difficulty is that, as Professor Karl Llewellyn vividly 
demonstrated, most canons of statutory interpretation have equal but opposite canons of 
statutory interpretation. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision 
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 
401-06 (1950). In this particular context, the canon in favor of common law rules is the 
opposite of the canon in favor of construing remedial statutes broadly. Id. at 401; see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 459 
n.201 (1989). See generally Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. L. 
REv. 627, 629 (1987) (criticizing the use of canons of interpretation with the observation that 
"the only 'canons' we [legislators] talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought that 
could not shoot straight"). Because this Note need not rely on the strength of the canon in 
favor of common law rules as an affirmative argument in favor of a certain rule, this section 
uses this canon only to show that a federal rule upholding plan limitation periods is not 
inconsistent with BRISA. 
211. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
212. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980) (identi-
fying this goal as one of the primary purposes· of BRISA). 
213. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
214. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980) ("[P]laintiffs can still readily 
enforce their claims ... simply by commencing their actions within three years."). 
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Nevertheless, an unduly short plan period, one effectively nulli-
fying or placing an undue burden on the section 502(a)(l)(B) rem-
edy, would be inconsistent with the federal policy embodied in 
BRISA. But the common law rule discussed in section IV.A directs 
courts to honor contractual limitation periods only if such periods 
provide a potential plaintiff a reasonable length of time for a 
lawsuit.21s 
In Burnett v. Grattan, 216 the Supreme Court closely examined 
the practicalities of filing a suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 
or 1986217 in holding that a six-month state statute of limitations 
was inappropriately short and thus inconsistent with the federal 
policy behind these statutes.218 The Court held that "[a]n appropri-
ate limitations period must be responsive to [the] characteristics of 
litigation under the federal statutes."219 The principles and holding 
of Burnett suggest that federal courts should look to the practicali-
ties of filing a section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit to decide whether a plan 
limitation period is unduly short, and that judges should not be shy 
about invalidating unreasonable plan periods that place an undue 
burden on the section 502(a)(l)(B) remedy.220 This vigilance 
should allay the fear that courts will adopt unduly short limitation 
periods. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal common law issues arise in an incredible variety of legal 
and factual contexts. Such variety makes articulation of overarch-
ing theories based on reasoning from first principles difficult. The 
framework developed in this Note is thus decidedly limited. The 
factors enumerated here are lenses designed to focus the thinking 
of courts and commentators deciding when to incorporate state law 
into federal law; the discussion of plan limitation periods provides a 
case study of how these factors may relate to one another. The 
factors as applied here indicate that courts should adopt a uniform 
national rule upholding reasonable plan limitation periods. But the 
factors may work differently in another context, and new factors 
will undoubtedly surface. The strength of each factor, as well as its 
215. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text. 
216. 468 U.S. 42 (1984). 
217. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988). 
218. 468 U.S. at 49-55. 
219. 468 U.S. at 50. 
220. Courts could perform this function in two different ways. Courts could adjudicate 
the validity of different plan periods on a case by case basis, which would inevitably result in 
conflicting pronouncements about the reasonableness of different time periods. Alterna-
tively, courts could seek to draw a bright line rule and allow plan administrators to alter their 
plans accordingly. The latter option would, of course, be more consistent with the goals of 
uniformity and of preventing forum-shopping. Some courts, however, may view a bright-line 
standard as "judicial legislation," and choose a case-by-case approach on that ground. 
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relationship to other factors, also varies according to the legal and 
factual context. In the final analysis, courts should realize that they 
are engaging in policymaking of the most basic sort, and accord-
ingly seek to integrate the rules they fashion into the dual system of 
U.S. government. 
